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ABSTRACT 
 
In a world where for-profit enterprises are increasingly looking to maximize 
profits by engaging in privacy invading consumer-profiling techniques, the rise of 
ubiquitous computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) poses a major problem. If 
not acted upon quickly, the combination of Big Data with IoT will explode into a 
dystopian world that even George Orwell could not have predicted. 
The proposed project aims to fill a gap that no other solution is addressing, which 
is to reach a win-win scenario that works for both the enterprises and the 
consumers. It aims to do this by creating the building blocks for a consumer 
owned infrastructure that can provide both privacy for the user, and still enable 
the enterprises to achieve their high-level goals. 
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 INTRODUCTION 1.
This project as a concept dates back to 2007, when the author was contemplating 
the future of mobile marketing and how behavioural advertising and profiling by a 
smartphone were clearly a winning strategy. From advertising the author quickly 
jumped to context-aware computing, in which ads are just another type of content 
that can be adapted to the user’s context. 
At the time the author wrongly assumed that consumers cared enough about their 
privacy as to not allow any kind of profiling my mobile handsets, so a privacy 
protecting solution was needed. Works out that consumers do not care as much as 
we think, however more recent developments in the areas of Big Data and the 
Internet of Things (IoT) are more than enough justification to work on a privacy-
protecting alternative. 
This project involves the engineering of consumer-side infrastructure, in the shape 
of a small personal server that will allow the users to engage in self-profiling, 
opening the way for higher-level interactions with enterprises without sharing 
private data. 
The project was developed in a prototyping fashion, with an initial focus on the 
hardware. Future work will build upon this, by creating a peer-to-peer network of 
consumer devices that can work together to achieve the same high-level goals of 
Big Data analytics without incurring privacy issues for the consumers. 
This thesis is just the beginning of a long journey. Fasten your seat belts. 
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 LITERATURE REVIEW 2.
 INTRODUCTION 2.1.
Ubiquitous computing in general, and context-aware computing in particular, have 
the potential to revolutionize the way humans interact with their environment, by 
allowing technology to adapt to individuals and their constantly changing needs. 
As will be shown section 2.2, ubiquitous computing can even make possible 
unique new benefits to society that otherwise would be difficult or impossible to 
achieve. 
Unfortunately that same ecosystem of technologies generates a vast amount of 
personal data and carries a significant risk in the form of invasion of privacy. This 
is due to both a lack of security in the technology stack as well as economic 
motives that lead to explicit privacy intrusion by third parties, in what is now 
commonly referred to as Big Data Analytics. This problem cannot be understated. 
To support this view section 2.3.2 includes enough research evidence that should 
scare away even the strongest of ubiquitous computing enthusiasts. 
If invasion of privacy is recognized as a major problem, not only from ubiquitous 
computing but also from other recent technological, economic and political 
developments, then it is only natural that efforts have been made to address the 
issue. Some of these efforts are covered in section 2.4. 
Unfortunately despite well-intentioned efforts, strong economic and political 
forces continue to drive society towards an Orwellian future without privacy. 
 17 
 UBIQUITOUS AND CONTEXTUAL COMPUTING 2.2.
“The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They 
weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are 
indistinguishable from it.” (Weiser, 1991) 
 
 UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 2.2.1.
Ubiquitous computing (Ubicomp) is a term coined in 1988 by Mark Weiser and 
defines the concept that computing power can be available everywhere, embedded 
in every object that users interact with. 
Continuous improvements in integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing, as predicted 
by Moore’s Law (Moore, 1998, 2006), enabled not only increased computing 
power but also the ability to fit more of that power in increasingly smaller form-
factors. 
Interestingly, if we take a step back in time and look at the history of computation 
from a broader scale, Moore’s Law can be interpreted as an extension of a trend 
that had already started in the early 1900s. The fact is that computational power 
has been growing at an exponential rate for more than a century. Ray Kurzweil 
(2005) captured this trend in the following graph, which uses a logarithmic scale 
for the Y-axis. 
 18 
 
Source: (Kurzweil, 2005, p. 70) 
Figure 1 - Exponential Growth of Computing for 110 Years 
Note: Each dot is a computing machine (the most computationally powerful at the 
time) 
 
Mainframe computers that traditionally occupied whole rooms gave way to the 
Personal Computer (PC) that could fit on a user’s desk. Portable computers, tablet 
devices and smart-phones continued the trend, and allowed mobile computing. 
More recently smart watches and other wearable devices ensure that persons are 
seldom found without some form of computing power at their disposal at any 
given moment. 
This trend towards smaller devices also had an obvious impact on the types of 
user interfaces, with increased simplicity happening as a by-product. Donald 
Norman, famous for coining the term “user-centered design” (1988), predicted in 
the late 90s that “invisible” information appliances were not only inevitable but a 
desirable alternative to the complexities of the PC (1998). 
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Source: (“Ubiquitous Computing – Living in a Smart World,” 2004) 
Figure 2 - Progression from Mainframe to Ubiquitous Computing 
 
Most importantly, the users no longer interact with computers in the traditional 
sense. The interaction is increasingly with every-day items that happen to feature 
embedded computing capabilities. 
 THE INTERNET OF THINGS 2.2.2.
Communication technologies have also played an important role in the trend 
towards always-connected devices. The creation of the Internet and advances in 
both high-bandwidth technologies like fibre optics, capable of transmitting data at 
multiple Gigabits per second, as well as wireless communication technologies, 
such as cellular networks (i.e. GSM), WiFi, Bluetooth, Near Field Communication 
(NFC), and ZigBee, amongst others, ensure that almost every device, no matter 
how small, can remain connected to the Internet and become a node in what is 
now popularly called the Internet-of-Things (IoT). 
The potential growth for the IoT industry is significant and, according to John 
Chambers, CEO of Cisco, it could become a US$19 trillion market (Kharif, 2014). 
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 SMART PERSONAL DEVICES 2.2.2.1.
The embedding of computing in everyday appliances is also reflected by the 
growing trend of labelling these appliances as “smart”. It is easy to forget that less 
than 20 years ago mobile phones were used primarily for making and receiving 
phone calls whilst on the go. Nowadays the voice calling function in smartphones 
is arguably one of the lesser-used ones, giving way to web browsing, instant 
messaging, photo and video recording, and usage of other apps, ranging from 
gaming to social networking. 
Smartphones however, are only the beginning. Television sets are also becoming 
“smart TVs”. Connected to the Internet, these devices can download various kinds 
of content from the cloud, and run a number of network-dependent applications on 
them, including voice and gesture detection, a controversial feature that will be 
further discussed later. 
 
 
Source: (Cruze, 2014) 
Figure 3 - A Range of Smart Devices 
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Several other types of every day items are becoming interconnected and available 
as smart devices on the market. Examples are the Ilumi1, a smart light bulb that 
allows remote control via mobile phones, Nest2 a smart thermostat that tracks and 
learns room occupancy patterns over time in order to save energy, the Luna3 smart 
mattress that learns from user’s sleeping habits (and potentially other activities) 
and that features a smart alarm and individual temperature control for each side of 
the bed, and the Aria smart weighing scale from Fitbit4. During meals users can 
also track what they eat with SmartPlate5, how fast they eat it with the HAPIfork6 
smart fork, and the quantity and type of drink that they consume from the Vessyl7 
smart cup. After each meal the internet-connected smart toothbrush Kolibree8 will 
record their user’s brushing technique, providing insights into their tooth hygiene 
practices as well as turning the activity of brushing teeth into a game for the 
younger users. Even our home plants can benefit from smart pots like Click-and-
Grow9 that automatically provide the plant with the right amount of water and 
nutrients at the right time. Elsewhere in our increasingly smarter homes we will 
find smart toasters10, smart fridges11, smart garage doors12, smart baby monitors13, 
and smart yoga mats14.  
                                                
1 http://ilumi.co 
2 https://nest.com 
3 http://lunasleep.com 
4 https://www.fitbit.com/uk/aria 
5 http://getsmartplate.com 
6 https://www.hapi.com/product/hapifork 
7 https://www.myvessyl.com 
8 http://www.kolibree.com/ 
9 http://www.clickandgrow.com/pages/what-is-click-grow 
10 http://www.brevilleusa.com/smart-toaster.html 
11 http://www.samsung.com/us/appliances/refrigerators/RF28HMELBSR/AA 
12 https://garageio.com/ 
13 http://www2.withings.com/us/en/products/baby/smart-baby-monitor 
14 https://smartmat.com/ 
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Nearly every month the technology sections of crowdfunding websites such as 
Kickstarter1 see new campaigns raising funds for the next household item that 
hasn’t yet received the smartening treatment. 
 WEARABLE COMPUTING 2.2.2.2.
Embedded computing and smart devices are also making their way into items that 
people wear. If the electronic wristwatch is itself not a novelty, having been 
introduced in the 1970s, more recent smartwatches are pushing the boundaries of 
connectedness in wrist wearable devices. Accessing basic computing functionality 
on the wrist is very convenient, including the ability to glance at the wrist to 
quickly check notifications that would otherwise involve removing a smartphone 
from a pocket. Both Apple, with the Apple Watch, and Google, with a range of 
Android Wear smartwatches manufactured by various partners, have recently 
pushed this technology to the hands of a fast growing user base. 
Parents who want to keep track of the whereabouts of their young children are 
also increasingly purchasing wearable GPS tracking watches and bracelets, such 
as the Tinitell2. 
 
Between 2013 and 2015 Google experimented with an optical head-mounted 
display (OHMD) called Google Glass. This device has the capability to display 
basic information to the user on its OHMD and accepted input both via speech 
and a touchpad on the side of the device. It was also loaded with sensors such as 
accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, ambient light sensor and proximity 
                                                
1 https://www.kickstarter.com 
2 http://www.tinitell.com/ 
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sensor. Arguably the most controversial feature is the head-mounted camera, 
which allows the user to take pictures or make video recordings with simple voice 
commands. As will be discussed in section 2.3.2, the camera feature pushed the 
threshold of what people were willing to accept in relation to privacy. If the 
Google Glass is being adopted for some industrial applications, it was clearly 
rejected by the consumer market. 
 
Source: (Reynolds, 2015) 
Figure 4 - Google Glass 
 
Having said that, several companies are working on wearable glasses technology 
for commercial use, and an especially interesting application is eye tracking. The 
ability to not only record a scene from the user’s point of view (PoV) but to also 
track with accuracy the point in space where the user’s eyes are focusing on has 
many applications, not least in usability and marketing research. Google filed for 
several patents in this area, hinting that the Google Glass would at some stage 
incorporate that feature (Calderone, 2014). SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI) is 
another company that already produces eye-tracking wearables, such as the Eye 
Tracking Glasses 2 Wireless (SMI ETG 2w) product. 
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Source: (SMI, 2015) 
Figure 5 - SMI Eye Tracking Glasses 2 Wireless (SMI ETG 2w) 
 
Fitness and wellness related wearables have also been reaching the market 
recently, with a wide range of activity trackers available led by the popular Fitbit1 
and Jawbone2 brands. Activity tracking technology is also finding its way into 
smartwatches and smartphones, with several Android device manufacturers 
integrating hardware sensors that efficiently replicate the features of dedicated 
fitness trackers directly in Android handsets and wearables. New Android APIs 
also allow app developers to efficiently access sensor data in a way that minimises 
battery consumption (Google, 2015). 
Finally, in the area of security and authentication, Nymi3 offers a wearable 
bracelet that uses biometrics, namely the user’s heart rate footprint, to verify that 
the correct user in indeed present and adds another factor into any existing multi-
factor authentication systems. 
                                                
1 http://www.fitbit.com/ 
2 https://jawbone.com/ 
3 http://www.getnymi.com/ 
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 IMPLANTABLE AND INGESTIBLE COMPUTING 2.2.2.3.
In addition to embedded devices and sensors worn in clothing, technology has 
been already been adapted to be implanted in human bodies, typically for health 
reasons. Pacemakers and even artificial organs, such as hearts and lungs can 
provide life-saving temporary replacements until a valid organic organ becomes 
available through organ donation programs. Implantable continuous glucose 
sensors such as those produced by GlySens1 and Senseonics2 provide people with 
diabetes with real-time information on their smartphones. 
Doctors will soon prescribe ingestible “smart pills”. The first such device, that 
tracks whether patients with mental illness problems are taking their medicines on 
schedule, has already been approved by the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and is expected to go on sale towards the end of 2015 (Ward, 2015). 
 LOCATION-BASED SYSTEMS AND GEOFENCING 2.2.3.
Location-based systems or services (LBS) date back to the early 1990s with the 
introduction of the indoors Active Badge System (Want, Hopper, Falcão, & 
Gibbons, 1992) which allowed the tracking of infrared-based devices worn by 
employees whilst in the office. 
Since then we have seen a proliferation of LBS both in commercial and consumer 
settings, using location extracting technologies that range from satellite global 
positioning system (GPS), mobile network cell tower positioning, and WiFi 
access point tracking. For example, vehicle tracking is used in both contexts, with 
                                                
1 http://glysens.com 
2 http://senseonics.com 
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companies tracking their vehicle fleets and consumers cars featuring theft-tracking 
systems. 
Consumers are increasingly actively providing their location data by using social 
networks that allow the users to “check-in” to physical locations, like restaurants, 
cinemas, and other public locations. This is probably the least privacy invading 
LBS data acquisition method since the users are proactively and consciously 
sharing their location publicly, although as will be discussed later, the users are 
seldom aware of the potentially far-reaching implications of sharing such kind of 
personal data. 
Other LBS systems that are popular with consumers include car navigation 
systems1, discovery of nearby services2, fitness activity mapping apps3, family 
member tracking apps for those who want to know the whereabouts of their loved 
ones4, and even location based massive multiplayer games5. 
A more recent method of location tracking that is gaining momentum in 
commercial contexts is called geofencing. It involves the use of low-power active 
beacons positioned in close proximity to create “virtual fences” that can be used to 
pinpoint with accuracy the location of consumers in commercial spaces like 
shopping malls (Namiot & Sneps-Sneppe, 2013) in order to gain insights into 
consumer behaviour patterns and also to provide them with relevant real-time 
information on their smartphones. Apple and Google are currently pushing two 
                                                
1 http://tomtom.com 
2 https://foursquare.com/ 
3 http://www.mapmyfitness.com 
4 http://www.life360.com 
5 https://www.ingress.com 
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competing beacon communication standards, namely iBeacon and Eddystone. 
Two prominent beacon manufactures are NewAer1 and Estimote2.  
 CONTEXT 2.2.4.
To a large extent, the motivation for the current project stemmed from the 
author’s determination to develop context aware applications whilst avoiding 
producing privacy invading technologies. 
If the current project aims to produce a privacy friendly framework, it is 
undoubtedly to pave the way for future research into context, and therefore a 
review of context-related literature will help frame the future work. 
Anind Dey provides the following definition of context: 
“Context is any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an 
entity. An entity is a person, place, or object that is considered relevant to the 
interaction between a user and an application, including the user and 
applications themselves” (Dey, 2001). 
Dey and Abowd go further in categorising context into tiers. Location, identity, 
time and activity are considered primary context tiers, which map to who, what, 
what and when, whereas other information such as phone numbers, addresses, list 
of friends, etc, are considered secondary tiers, since they can be extracted from 
various data sources given the primary tier. In other words, the primary tier 
context can be considered an index to the secondary tier context (Dey & Abowd, 
1999). 
                                                
1 https://newaer.com/ 
2 http://estimote.com/ 
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 CONTEXT-AWARE COMPUTING 2.2.4.1.
Context-aware computing is a term coined by Schilit and Theimer (1994) and it 
defines a category of computer systems that can: 
1. Sense the user’s environment and context, and 
2. Adapt to that context to better serve the user. 
Context-aware computing has recently gained attention from major industry 
companies such as Google, Apple and Microsoft. 
 CONTEXT-AWARE PERSONAL ASSISTANTS 2.2.4.2.
Google made significant progress into context-aware computing with their Google 
Now personal assistant. Available in both Android and iOS, it uses a speech 
recognition interface along with a natural language processing engine to make 
recommendations and answer questions, whilst making use of the user’s context 
to filter the most relevant information. It can even pro-actively nudge the user 
with relevant information at the right time, without the user requesting it.  
Apple, which already featured its Siri personal assistant on iOS devices, also 
focused on making it more proactive like Google Now, with the introduction of 
the Proactive Assistant update to Siri (Lardinois, 2015). 
Microsoft similarly added contextual-awareness to its own personal assistant, 
Cortana, by making use of structured data in e-mail messages (Microsoft, 2014).  
 QUANTIFIED-SELF 2.2.5.
We are witnessing a boom in the adoption of wearables for self-tracking. The now 
called quantified-self movement (G. Wolf, 2014) is growing at a considerable 
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rate. ABI Research estimated that sports and activity trackers will exceed 485 
million annually shipped units by 2018 (ABI Research, 2013). 
The potential for fitness and health tracking is especially promising. England’s 
Rugby Sevens team employ a system developed by StatSports1, which tracks 
every player during training. The system’s wearable sensors feature GPS, 
accelerometer, magnetometer, and gyroscope, to track in real time the smallest 
detail in the player’s movements. The team’s head physical performance coach, 
Brett Davinson, claims that the data is so sensitive and accurate that they can 
predict when a player is susceptible to injury or illness 24 hours before the player 
himself is conscious of any symptoms (Fong, 2013). Similarly, Dr Eric Topol is 
leading the way in prescribing mobile apps for self-tracking as an alternative to 
traditional medicines for treating or managing chronic diseases. According to Dr. 
Topol, heart rate, blood glucose and even air quality and pollen sensors, can go a 
long way to predict and possibly prevent life-threatening crisis (Fong, 2013). 
 THREATS TO PRIVACY 2.3.
If on the one hand ubiquitous computing and context-aware computing have the 
potential to revolutionise the way we interact with technology and provide 
significant benefits to individuals and society, on the other hand the risks in terms 
of privacy are equally substantial. 
The problem stems from the fact that enterprises are increasingly turning to 
consumer tracking and consumer data as a business model. 
                                                
1 http://statsports.com/ 
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 KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER 2.3.1.
“Know your customer” (KYC) is a well-established tenet of marketing, with 
consumer profiling being the foundation upon which other marketing activities 
depend on (Brassington & Petitt, 2006). This recording and classification of 
consumer behaviour relies on multiple methods of consumer tracking, including 
credit card transactions, loyalty card usage, online tracking, web searches, and 
more recently face recognition (N. Wolf, 2012) amongst others. Furthermore, 
large online service operators such as Google and Facebook, take advantage of the 
large amounts of personal consumer data stored on their data silos to engage in 
behavioural analysis (Elmer, 2004) for the purpose of selling targeted advertising 
(Rushe, 2013) (Moriarty, Mitchell, & Wells, 2009). 
Nowadays most major retail stores track their customers through credit card 
numbers and analyse their shopping behaviour for consumer insights (Duhigg, 
2012). One such chain, the US based Target, famously calculated that a teenage 
girl was pregnant before her own family found out (Hill, 2012). 
 THE COST OF FREE AND THE END OF PRIVACY 2.3.2.
The World Wide Web has evolved significantly since its original proposal by Sir 
Tim Berners-Lee (Berners-Lee, 1990). Even though it is nowadays highly 
commercialised, most services remain free of charge for the users. 
Traditionally the business model that sustains free online services is advertising, 
but if on the one hand advertising per-se does not entail privacy issues, on the 
other hand services are increasingly turning to consumer profiling techniques in 
order to improve the relevance of those adverts. In effect, “free” online services 
are not really free. Users are in fact paying for those services with their personal 
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data. When Google launched their free web mail service, Gmail, it sparked a 
privacy row (Rushe, 2013) (BBC, 2004). Privacy conscious users were concerned 
about the fact that Google was snooping on the content of emails in order to serve 
more targeted advertising. However Gmail remains a very popular email service, 
and paved the way for others to follow suit in conducting similar privacy invading 
practices. From the point of view of the consumer, the convenience of accessing 
free services seems to outweigh the privacy issues inherent with it. Trust in well-
known web service providers may also play a factor in this complicity. However 
trusting personal data to commercial entities also carries the risk that those entities 
may one day be sold or go bankrupt. In such cases, the customer data is 
considered a commodity that is sold to the highest bidder, along side the other 
assets of the company (Singer & Merrill, 2015). 
 IOT TRACKING 2.3.3.
If offline and web-based tracking carry privacy risks, the introduction of IoT 
raises these issues to unprecedented heights. 
Manufacturers of smart devices are increasingly waking up to the potential value 
of consumer data, and as such are engineering their IoT devices to automatically 
upload the user’s data to their own cloud. Smart TV manufacturers LG were 
investigated by the UK’s information commissioner when it was found that their 
smart TVs were sending information about viewing habits as well as files stored 
on attached USB disks back to Korean company (Arthur, 2013). More recently 
Samsung were in the news for the wrong reasons, when it was reported that their 
voice controlled smart TVs were sending recordings and transcripts of their user’s 
private conversations back to the manufacturer, in order to improve their voice 
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recognition software (Bigelow, 2015). This worrying development invoked 
memories of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four novel and its famous 
Telescreen appliance, which acted as both a television and a CCTV camera 
(Orwell, 1949). 
 
 
Figure 6 - Detail of a Samsung Smart TV 
 
Google Glass, in another example, quickly raised privacy concerns from people 
who were reluctant to be recorded in social and private contexts. The device was 
famously banned from bars, restaurants and several other types of establishments, 
and the derogatory term “glasshole” was popularly adopted to define users of the 
device (Schuster, 2014). Google eventually discontinued the project with privacy 
issues being commonly referred to when justifying its failure (Bilton, 2015). 
At this stage it is worth to contrast the differences in consumer resistance towards 
Google Glass versus the increasingly pervasive CCTV technology. Although both 
technologies record people, the more intimate and visible nature of Google Glass, 
plus the fact that it also recorded sound, which is seldom the fact with CCTV, 
meant that people were not capable of accepting the former. It is therefore 
important to point out that, even in the current context of overall diminished 
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privacy, there are still some privacy-related thresholds that people will simply not 
allow to be violated. 
 BIG DATA 2.3.4.
The large amounts of consumer data gathered by enterprises, and subsequence 
analysis for gaining consumer insights has led to the coining of the term big data. 
Although big data is itself not a new paradigm, the recent attention gathered 
around it has created a thriving industry of companies that specialise in everything 
from storing to data mining. One of the problems created with storing large 
amounts of data in centralised data silos is that it attracts the attention of tech-
savvy criminals who hope to profit from stealing and selling on the data. 
 SECURITY ISSUES 2.3.5.
When enterprises are not willingly violating the trust of the consumers through 
explicit privacy invading practices, they often do so accidentally due to poor 
security standards around the storage of the consumer data. 
Even governments, who are expected to keep to the highest standards in 
information security, regularly leak large amounts of private information. For 
example, the US Federal officers database was recently compromised, leaking 
between 14 and 21 million personal records and putting each and every one of 
those persons at risk of identity theft or worst (Perez & Prokupecz, 2015). 
A couple of attack vectors will be explored below. 
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 THERMAL ATTACK ON AIRGAPPED COMPUTERS 2.3.5.1.
A new attack vector using thermal radiation was recently demonstrated. By 
controlling the throttling of CPU and GPUs a machine can create heat patterns 
that can be detected by a nearby system, even if both systems are air gapped 
(Zetter, 2015) (Guri, Monitz, Mirski, & Elovici, 2015). The attack does require 
both systems to be compromised in advance, in order to collude in the data 
transfer, in close proximity, and with built-in temperature sensors. Most modern 
CPUs come with such built-in sensors. 
 TEMPEST ATTACKS 2.3.5.2.
TEMPEST attacks involve the detection of minute electromagnetic fluctuations 
around the system under attack, in order to extract valuable information such as a 
private key used in encryption. Normally these kinds of attacks require specialised 
hardware and physical access to the target machine, but there are other situations 
in which two machines in close proximity can communicate via electromagnetic 
or radio waves. 
 SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS 2.3.5.3.
If on the one hand centralized silos with large amounts of personal data act as 
honey pots and attract the attention of malicious hackers, on the other hand having 
a decentralized network of nodes is not by itself a guarantee of resilience against 
attacks, especially if any aspect of the network relies on a centrally accessible 
services or directories of nodes that can be easily targeted by malicious hackers. 
Such services, such as Dynamic DNS (DDNS) or Remote Access Services, offer 
convenient ways for users to access their home devices from anywhere, however 
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the author believes these services restore the undesirable honeypot aspect of the 
network. Taking the Synology NAS device as an example, the author found 
anecdotal evidence that links the setting up of a device with a Dynamic DNS 
service with a significant high number of unauthorized login attempts to said 
device. Furthermore, when a Synology vulnerability is exploited, it is invariably 
the case that numerous users are affected in a short period of time, showing that 
the attackers know exactly which IP addresses to target when launching the attack. 
Synology has gone so far as to disable the remote access services from nodes that 
are found to be running exploitable versions of their operating system. Whilst this 
is a sensible procedure for mitigating known attack vectors, the fact is that users 
of such services are still vulnerable to zero-day attacks. 
Additional attack vectors rely on homogeneous default configurations amongst the 
peers, such as using a well-known public port number. Again using Synology as 
an example, when a vulnerability was found in the operating system, network 
security firms detected a sharp rise in Internet port scanning specific to the default 
port used by Synology NAS devices, in this case port 5000, as shown in Figure 7. 
This particular event happened in February 2014, when news reported that 
Synology devices were falling victim to a remote attack that turned the devices 
into cryptocurrency miners, netting the attackers an estimated USD $600,000 
(Litke, 2014). 
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Source: (Litke, 2014) 
Figure 7 – Scan activity for port 5000, Feb 1 2013 through May 9 2014 
 EXISTING PRIVACY PROTECTION EFFORTS 2.4.
Some efforts have been made to protect consumer privacy, and the following 
sections will highlight some of them. 
 REGULATIONS 2.4.1.
Regulation aims to restrict what data enterprises can collect, for what purposes 
and for how long it can be stored. However regulations create friction that the 
enterprises will attempt to work around. As long as the incentive is to collect 
personal data, enterprises will always find a way to achieve their goals whilst 
remaining on the right side of the law. 
Some industries do in fact try to self-regulate in this regard, through non-profit 
organisations such as the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI)1, and the Digital 
Advertising Alliance (DAA) Self-Regulatory Program2 but one must question the 
effectiveness of these efforts coming from an industry that is increasingly more 
dependent on mining consumer data. 
 
                                                
1 http://www.networkadvertising.org/ 
2 http://www.aboutads.info/ 
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 PERSONAL DATA STORES 2.4.2.
With the rise of the web and the cloud in recent years, and subsequent control 
over our data by enterprises, there is a growing feeling that we are entering an age 
of “digital feudalism” (CGCS, 2012) and as a result a number of projects have 
been started which aim to provide user-controlled alternatives to the cloud. 
Existing projects will be compared against the proposed project via a set of 
criteria, namely whether they provide a: 
• Personal Server (PS) device that hosts the personal data and digital-self: 
o Hardware 
o Software 
o Behavioral Data Analysis 
• Self-tracking software (STS) that sends data exclusively the PS; 
• Privacy-Protecting (PPAPI) to the digital-self. 
The personal server/cloud projects can be divided into 2 categories, a) software 
and b) hardware solutions: 
a) Software projects need to be installed on commodity hardware, such as a 
personal computer, a small plug computer or a Network Attached Storage 
(NAS) device. This does require considerable know-how by the user, as 
well as resulting in a system that is poorly integrated, and potentially 
insecure. 
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Software projects include, OwnCloud 1 , CozyCloud 2 , FreedomBox 3 , 
Sneer4, and Unhosted5. 
b) Hardware solutions comprise of both software and hardware integrated 
into a product, which normally provides a better user experience. These 
include the TonidoPlug6, SpaceMonkey7, and Transporter8. These projects 
currently aim to provide self-hosted alternatives to cloud-based file storage 
services such as Dropbox9. 
 
Table 1 summarizes how these projects fare against the above-mentioned criteria. 
As can be seen, none of them apply behavioral data analysis to the user’s data, nor 
do they provide a privacy-protecting API for enterprises. 
 
 PS STS PPAPI Hardware Software Data Analysis 
CozyCloud No Yes No No No 
FreedomBox No Yes No No No 
OwnCloud No Yes No No No 
Unhosted No Yes No No No 
TonidoPlug Yes Yes No No No 
SpaceMonkey Yes Yes No No No 
Transporter Yes Yes No No No 
Table 1 - Existing projects do not fulfill required criteria 
 
                                                
1 http://owncloud.org 
2 https://www.cozycloud.cc 
3 http://freedomboxfoundation.org 
4 https://sneer.me 
5 http://unhosted.org 
6 http://www.tonidoplug.com 
7 http://www.spacemonkey.com 
8 http://filetransporterstore.com 
9 http://dropbox.com 
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It should be mentioned that a large number of mobile apps do exist for self-
tracking (STS), such as Expereal1 for mood tracking, Sleep as Android2 for sleep 
tracking and RunKeeper3 for tracking fitness activities, however none of them 
integrate with a PS, and those that synchronize data with an external system 
choose to do it on servers controlled by the app developer, outside the control of 
the consumer. These apps obviously follow the traditional cloud approach that the 
proposed project aims to replace, and hence were omitted from this analysis. 
 
 SUMMARY 2.5.
In summary, even though there are a large number of projects that do attempt to 
address the diminishing power of consumers in the traditional cloud, as well as 
provide them with increased privacy, none address the marketing needs of 
enterprises, and as a result these enterprises will continue to engage in privacy 
invading practices in order to achieve their goals. 
Grokya will attempt to fill this gap by creating an optimum solution that 
simultaneously satisfies the needs of both consumers and enterprises. 
                                                
1 http://expereal.com 
2 http://sites.google.com/site/sleepasandroid 
3 http://runkeeper.com 
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 SYSTEM DESIGN AND SPECIFICATION 3.
 “If I had asked people what they wanted,  
they would have said faster horses” – Henry Ford 
 
 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 3.1.
Similarly to the Henry Ford quotation that opened this chapter, Steve Jobs once 
famously said “in the end, for something this complicated, it's really hard to 
design products by focus groups. A lot of times, people don't know what they want 
until you show it to them” (Reinhardt, 1998). 
This project follows Ford’s and Job’s philosophy by applying a Genius Design 
approach (Saffer, 2009), which relies primarily on the individual vision, 
inspiration, and skill of the designer, whose product is subsequently validated by 
the users. This approach was chosen because, as explained in the previous chapter, 
the overall concept of the project presents a significant departure from previous 
concepts and there is no prior art that the users can relate to. 
 GROKYA GUIDING PRINCIPLES 3.2.
Before designing the proposed solution a few guiding principles were established 
in order to ensure all future decisions conform to the designer’s vision. When 
making design and implementation decisions, those decisions should be 
influenced by these principles as much as possible. These principles will be 
referred to as Grokya Guiding Principles (GGP): 
 
1. Technology should always adapt to the user, not the other way around; 
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2. An invisible and unobtrusive system is always better than one that 
interrupts the user or requires constant manual feedback; 
3. A transparent and trustless system is always better than one that requires 
trust on third parties; 
4. Don’t make the user think, use sensible defaults as much as possible, and 
ideally learn the desirable defaults from the user’s behaviour; 
5. Any system or any person who contributes to the generation of value 
(utility or economic) should receive a fair reward for their contribution; 
6. Sharing of data cannot be undone. If privacy though data protection is the 
goal, then adopt a share-nothing strategy as much as possible. Always ask 
what do you want to do with that data, and share the higher-level desired 
solution instead of the raw data. 
 
Following sections may make a reference to a particular GGP by use of its 
number. For example, GGP#4 is a reference to the “don’t make the user think” 
principle. 
 OVERALL ARCHITECTURE 3.3.
The main purpose of this project is to present a privacy-preserving alternative to 
traditional big data analytics. The plan is to achieve this by introducing a 
consumer owned personal server, herein called LifeServer (LS), as a viable 
personal data storage alternative to the traditional cloud. The main distinctions 
from existing consumer personal data store (PDS) solutions are: 
• Focus on implicit data acquisition from IoT devices for contextual 
awareness; 
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• A trusted hardware platform, the LS, where private data can be securely 
stored; 
• An API that allows for enterprises to conduct high-level analytics and 
marketing activities, such as behavioural advertising, without direct access 
to personal data. 
 CENTRALIZED VS DECENTRALISED VS DISTRIBUTED 3.3.1.
One of the main architectural questions was regarding the decentralisation of the 
platform. 
 
Source: (Baran, 1964) 
Figure 8 - Centralised vs Decentralised vs Distributed 
 
Centralized infrastructure represents a single-point of failure in terms of security. 
If a security breach occurs in a centralised architecture, then the whole system has 
failed and the all the data is compromised, or at least that data which is not 
encrypted. Central repositories of data also act as “honey pots”, attracting the 
focused attention of malicious hackers who benefit the most from gaining access 
to a potential gold mine in terms of valuable data. Finally, a centralised 
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architecture entails a central authority in charge of the infrastructure, on which the 
users must trust. This last point clearly goes against GGP #3. 
It could be argued that even decentralised, or federated systems, also rely on trust 
on third parties, although to a much lesser extent that fully centralised systems. 
For this reason, the proposed project will aim for a fully distributed architecture, 
minimising the need for trust on any third parties. 
 DISTRIBUTED BIG DATA 3.3.2.
Looking at the big picture in terms of big data, the goal is to allow consumers to 
reclaim their personal data and to keep it under their own exclusive control, by 
offering them the consumer infrastructure to do so with minimum effort. These 
consumer personal servers should also find and connect to other consumer’s 
servers and create a p2p network that allows for collaborative data mining and 
analytics, without leaking personally identifying information. This p2p network of 
anonymised data analytics will then allow enterprises to extract high-level insights 
and perform other marketing related activities. 
 
Figure 9 - Big Data: Centralised vs Decentralised 
 
Value for Enterprise
Big Data Analytics
Traditional Enterprise Controlled Big Data Decentralised Consumer Controlled Big Data
Consumer Data
Big Data Analytics
Value for Enterprise
Consumer Data
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In the above figure, with enterprises on top and consumers at the bottom, the red 
shaded area denotes the enterprise domain, and the green the consumer domain. In 
the traditional big data model the moment that consumer data is generated it is 
stored in enterprise controlled data centres giving the enterprises full stewardship 
of the data with the resulting implications for consumer privacy. The proposed 
approach, on the right side of the figure, creates a consumer domain by providing 
consumers with their own infrastructure, solving the issue of privacy whilst still 
providing enterprises with their ultimate goal of extracting value from big data 
analytics. 
 VALUE DISTRIBUTION 3.3.3.
Another important component of this project is to provide economic incentives to 
all the stakeholders who are already engaged in IoT, big data, and other potential 
privacy-invading practices to switch to the new proposed paradigm. 
The reasoning here is that enterprises are not really interested in invading people’s 
privacy. Their main goal is to maximise profitability, and it so happens that 
gathering and analysing large amounts of personal consumer data is currently the 
most effective way to achieve those goals. 
Due to the distributed nature of this project a new protocol will be proposed: 
Value Distribution Protocol (VDP). This new protocol addresses the distribution 
of economic value amongst a large number of related stakeholders who 
contributed to the generation of that value using the Grokya platform. 
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 API OVERVIEW 3.4.
The following figure depicts a high-level view of the 3 main APIs (drawn in 
purple boxes) supported by the LS, and their role in the interactions with the IoT 
devices and the enterprises. 
 
Figure 10 – API overview 
 
The 3 APIs are: 
• Sense API: a protocol that allows external IoT sensors, devices and apps 
to contribute personal data to the user’s LS;  
• Act API: a protocol that allows the LS to control and customise external 
IoT apps and devices, enabling the personalisation of user experience and 
digital content presented to the user; 
• Mind API: a protocol and query language that allows third parties to gain 
insights from the user without being granted direct access to the user’s 
personal data.  
 
As clearly shown in Figure 10 above, the LS is not designed to interact directly 
with the user. Instead its main purpose is to interact with the user’s IoT devices, in 
order to learn from user behaviour and customise the user experience through 
those same devices. 
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The APIs will be explained in more detail in the following sections. 
 SENSE API 3.4.1.
The Sense API is the main personal data input channel of the LS. 
All IoT devices and apps that the user interacts over the course of time should 
make use of the Sense API to contribute all the user-specific data that was 
extracted from those interactions. 
This data will then be stored and made available for future data mining activities 
performed by the LS. 
Every IoT device or app that submits personal data via the Sense API is called a 
Data Source. The API allows for requests to optionally include meta-data that 
links a particular portion of data to a Data Source. This meta-data will allow the 
LS to share some of the economic revenue that resulted from analyzing that data 
on behalf of enterprises. 
 ACT API 3.4.2.
The Act API allows the LS to take control of external IoT devices and apps in pre-
defined ways so as to allow the customization of the user experience. 
The external devices and apps must expose a set of controls or configuration 
options that the LS will control during the user’s interaction with said devices. For 
example a smart light bulb can expose the necessary controls that allow the LS to 
control the light according to the user’s context. A modern car with electronically 
adjusted seats and mirrors can provide the LS with the controls that allow a quick 
re-configuration to the user’s preferred or last known setup. This last use case also 
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demonstrates how the car could have previously made use of the Sense API to 
provide the LS with any manual modifications that the user might have made. 
The usefulness of the Act API is that, by keeping the user preferences stored in 
the user’s LS, the user can effectively carry his personalized experience across a 
range of devices (such as cars), including those he or she never interacted with 
before. 
 MIND API 3.4.3.
The Mind API allows third parties to interact with the user’s LS in order to extract 
useful insights from the user and conduct high-level marketing activities without 
having direct access to the user’s personal data. 
Using the Mind API, marketing activities such as behavioural and targeted 
advertising will no longer require that third parties have access to the user’s 
personal data. Instead the enterprises push the advertising meta-data to the LS, 
which in turn internally selects any ads that are of high relevance and interest to 
the user and displays them where and when appropriate via the Act API. 
A Mind Query Language (MQL) should also allow for anonymised queries run 
over a large number of LS nodes, effectively providing statistical data from the 
network without identifying individuals. 
 VALUE DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOL (VDP) 3.5.
Given the distributed nature of the Grokya platform, with each user controlling 
their own LS, the problem of fairly rewarding stakeholders that contributed to 
value being generated by the platform is non-trivial. This section will describe a 
solution to this problem, the Value Distribution Protocol (VDP). Even though 
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VDP started as a small component of the Grokya project, it has generated enough 
interest as a stand-alone project that it was chosen to be presented at the Hackcoin 
blockchain hackathon in Hong Kong, winning the first prize at the event (Weese, 
2015). The protocol is now developed independently of the Grokya project in it’s 
own Github repository1 and the development of reference implementation is 
underway under project name Subatoshi2. 
 TRADITIONAL ADVERTISING REVENUE SHARING 3.5.1.
In a centralised platform, such as the typical advertising networks, the process of 
assigning value is straightforward. Advertisers pay the network for adverts to be 
displayed, and the network shares some of that revenue with the content-providers 
that carry the ads to the consumers. 
 
Figure 11 - Traditional Advertising Revenue Sharing 
 
What this simple revenue sharing model diagram fails to capture is the trading of 
personal consumer data that increasingly takes place behind the scenes, as was 
                                                
1 https://github.com/ktorn/vdp 
2 http://subsatoshi.org 
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discussed in the previous chapter. Figure 12 shows an example of data and 
economic value flows, with an advertising network as the final data silo. 
 
Figure 12 - Traditional Personal Data Brokerage Example 
 
A core concept in this proposal is that every entity that contributes to the new 
user-controlled platform should be fairly rewarded (GGP#5). This reward should 
provide enough of an economic incentive so that those same entities can 
discontinue their participation in the traditional privacy invading data brokerage 
activities. 
 REWARDING DATA SOURCES 3.5.2.
Examples of such entities are the IoT device manufacturers and smart phone app 
developers. The idea is that when a device or app contributes data to the LS, and if 
that data is later used in a transaction that generates economic value, then the 
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device manufacturer or app developer should receive a small payment as a result 
of their contribution to making the transaction a success. 
This means that every piece of data sent to the LS via the Sense API should be 
tagged with some kind of source identification metadata that uniquely identifies 
the source of the data. As will be explained below, this identification can be quite 
complex, since data can exist in various states of processing by different processes 
and aggregated by various sources. The proposed protocol needs to handle such 
complexities. 
 THE VDP PROTOCOL 3.5.3.
The basic building block of VDP is its configuration file: 
 
Source: (Farinha, 2015) 
version: 1
description: simple vdp file
split:
- id: contributors
  shares: 97
  split:
- id: stack
  shares: 3
  split:
- id: ktorn
  shares: 1
  crypto: bitcoin/1NahonrApDqaDbLn8KvK8EfU6omgug2JL6
- id: marcoleong
  shares: 1
  crypto: bitcoin/1EGisKrfTjD72gHhvAhWDNq5mLyUZ9VcUe
- id: gnupg
  shares: 1
  crypto: bitcoin/12LKeo24XCzgz6ASSxcUa8BvUfzkEyCpGq
        
- id: gnu/fsf
  shares: 1
  crypto: bitcoin/1PC9aZC4hNX2rmmrt7uHTfYAS3hRbph4UN
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Figure 13 - VDP basic configuration syntax 
 
A closer look at this example VDP configuration reveals 7 types of keywords: 
• version: the protocol version, currently at version 1; 
• description: a basic description of this configuration file or snippet; 
• split: takes as input the value to be distributed, and splits it amongst the 
child nodes, according to their relative shares; 
• id: identifies a node within a branch, which can be stakeholder, or another 
sub-branch. The id needs to be unique only within the scope of that 
branch; 
• shares: the shares of a node. The shares are relative to the other sibling 
nodes’ shares within that branch. For example, in Figure 13, under the 
contributors node, the sibling sub-nodes ktorn and marcoleong each have 
1 share, which means they split 50/50 of whatever value flows down to 
that branch, which in turn consists of 97% of the total value attributed by 
that VDP configuration. 
• crypto: a cryptocurrency address where the value can be paid into directly; 
• bitcoin: indicates that the cryptocurrency address is a bitcoin address, with 
other cryptocurrencies also a possibility. 
 
The power of VDP comes from its simple design, and also a key 8th keyword that 
is missing in the above example: 
• url: a node can have it’s configuration in an external file identified by a 
URL, either locally or in a remote server. 
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This means that a VDP configuration itself can be decentralized, with each VDP 
file hyperlinking to other VDP files, as exemplified in the following figure. 
 
Source: (Farinha, 2015) 
Figure 14 - Hyperlinked VDP files 
 
 VALUE COMPUTATION ENGINE 3.5.4.
With the basic VDP protocol in place we can see how it plays an important part in 
a typical use case where an enterprise is willing to pay for a particular actionable 
insight.  
version: 1
description: vdp file with url dep
split:
 - id: contributors
   shares: 97
   split:
- id: stack
    shares: 3
    split:
- id: ktorn
  shares: 1
  crypto: bitcoin/1NahonrApDqaDbLn8KvK8EfU6omgug2JL6
- id: marcoleong
  shares: 1
  crypto: bitcoin/1EGisKrfTjD72gHhvAhWDNq5mLyUZ9VcUe
- id: somedep
  shares: 1
  url: https://github.com/example/somedep/VDP.yml
        
- id: gnu/fsf
  shares: 1
  crypto: bitcoin/1PC9aZC4hNX2rmmrt7uHTfYAS3hRbph4UN
version: 1
description: somedep vdp file
split:
 - id: contributors
   shares: 98
   split:
- id: stack
    shares: 2
    split:
- id: gene
  shares: 1
  crypto: bitcoin/1H1Gr57ojoYqff9JVhHhCD6apbx9ZUPvrz
- id: serina
  shares: 1
  crypto: bitcoin/1EGisKrfTjD72gHhvAhWDNq5mLyUZ9VcUe
- id: someotherdep
  shares: 1
  url: https://github.com/example2/adep/VDP.yml
        
- id: yetanotherdep
  shares: 1
  url: https://github.com/example3/yand/VDP.yml
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Figure 15 - Example of Value Distribution with VDP 
 
In this example the following steps (indicated with numbers in Figure 15) take 
place: 
1. The user’s IoT devices and/or apps contribute user data to the LS via the 
Sense API. This data should include the device manufacturer’s or app 
developers VDP payee instructions as meta-data; 
2. The LS stores this data for later analysis. The stored data contains the data 
source meta-data; 
3. The LS receives, via the Mind API, a request from an enterprise. This 
request includes the business logic that enterprise whishes to run against 
the locally stored user data; 
4. The LS takes the business logic runs it against the stored user data. If the 
LS contains all the necessary data to perform the computation then the 
computation succeeds; 
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5. If the computation in step 4 completes successfully, the output will be both 
the actual computation result, i.e. an actionable insight that is valuable to 
the enterprise that requested it, and a VDP file that includes all the data 
sources that contributed to the data involved in the computation. 
6. A transaction is made via the Mind API between the enterprise and the LS. 
The enterprise pays a fee in return for the actionable insight. 
7. The LS takes the fee paid by the enterprise and the VDP file outputted in 
step 5 and processes the VDP payments, making a series of 
micropayments towards the manufacturers and developers of the data 
sources that contributed the user data used in step 4. 
 LIFESERVER HARDWARE 3.6.
This section details some of the decisions taken with regards to the LifeServer 
hardware. Most decisions will take into account the GGPs outlined in page 40. 
 HOSTING: SELF VS CLOUD 3.6.1.
With regards to the hosting of the user’s personal data, given the privacy 
implications of the traditional cloud-based big data paradigm one would naturally 
be inclined to choose self-hosting as a viable alternative. However the pros and 
cons of this decision should be explored in more depth. 
According to GGPs #1, #2, and #4, which are mostly concerned with technology 
that gets out of the way of the user, a cloud solution would actually provide the 
best option, since it doesn’t require any installation or maintenance by the user. 
However as discussed earlier, trusting a third party with personal data clearly goes 
against GGPs #3 and #6.
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The challenge then is to adopt a solution that does not violate these key GGPs and 
still achieves a relative ease of use and easy to maintain system. 
It is important to note that the issue with hosting data on the cloud is only an issue 
as long as the cloud operator has full access to that data. This is not always 
necessarily the case, since the data can be encrypted on the user side before being 
uploaded to the cloud. In such a case, the cloud provider will only be storing a 
blob of unreadable binary data, which does not raise any privacy issues. However 
this also means the cloud operator will not be able to perform any processing of 
that data to the benefit of the user, so the user would still have to rely on a device 
that would download the data from the cloud, decrypt it, and process it. Fully 
homomorphic encryption (Gentry, 2009) is a field of research that aims to allow 
computation directly on encrypted data, and is making progress towards that goal, 
however at present it is extremely inefficient for any practical application 
(Yegulalp, 2014). 
For this reason the decision is to rely on self-hosting with optional cloud-based 
backups of encrypted data. 
 DEDICATED VS SHARED HARDWARE 3.6.2.
The easiest way to get started with LS would be to just install the LS software on 
the user’s existing hardware, such as their smartphone or PC. However these are 
devices that the user interacts with directly, and which allow the installation of 
arbitrary applications at the user’s request. This raises significant security issues, 
since many applications may contain malware. Even mobile platforms such as 
Android and iOS, which require all applications to be manually verified and 
vetoed by their respective app stores, are known to feature apps that contain 
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malware. Google’s Android ecosystem with its Play Store sets a particularly bad 
example with large amounts of malware applications featuring on the official store 
(Hong, 2015), however even Apple with its much more rigours app review system 
has fallen victim to allowing thousands of malware carrying apps (BBC, 2015) 
(McGarry, 2015). 
For this reason, from a security perspective, the ideal option is to use dedicated 
hardware where only the LS software is allowed to run. 
 AIR-GAPPING WITH A DATA DIODE 3.6.3.
It is a widely accepted fact that due to the complexities in both hardware and 
software no system can be considered 100% secure. However when designing the 
LifeServer one of the goals was to provide a truly secure data storage area that the 
users can rely on to keep their most private data. One way to achieve security in 
an unsecure system is to disconnect it from all networks, in what is called “air-
gapping”, a common strategy in systems such as those in nuclear power plants, 
military systems, and life-critical systems. There are known attacks on air-gapped 
systems (NSA, 2014), and these should be also addressed in our implementation. 
An obvious problem with air-gapping the LS is that it would require a 
considerable amount of effort on the user to transfer data to and from the LS, and 
this would be unacceptable according to GGPs #1, #2, and #4. 
In order to mitigate this problem, but still ensure that data on the LS cannot be 
compromised remotely over a network, the solution is to use a unidirectional 
network, also called a data diode. 
A data diode is a physical link between two computers that only allows data to 
flow in one direction. Even if both computers try to reverse the flow of data, the 
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data diode will prevent it from happening at the hardware level. Typical 
implementations of data diodes rely on custom fibre-optic cables, but such a 
solution would be prohibitively expensive for a consumer product. A solution will 
be provided for this problem. 
 DUAL-SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 3.6.4.
Having all the data stored behind a data diode, whilst ensuring its security, would 
prevent the Act and Mind APIs from functioning properly. Some of the data must 
be kept in a machine that has 2-way communication with the outside world. For 
this reason the decision was to design a dual-system architecture, with one 
computer connecting to the Internet and another air-gapped through a one-way 
data diode. The “public” Internet connected computer will run all the APIs and 
only send the most private of data to the “private” computer, where it will be 
stored for later use. The privately stored data can actually be of use in some 
conditions, which will be described later. 
 
Figure 16 - A Dual-System Architecture 
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 SEALED STORAGE AND PROCESSING 3.6.5.
If use of a data diode ensures that no data can be transmitted out of the private 
RPi, which is a desirable security feature, the usefulness of that data will be very 
limited until it is moved from the private storage to another host where it can be 
processed and acted upon. 
A compromise should be reached where the data can flow in both ways but in a 
controlled manner, dictated by a thin layer of software that polices what data 
travels from the private to the public RPi. Furthermore, if the private RPi creates a 
secret private key, and shares the corresponding public key to the user’s devices, 
these devices can send highly private data to the private RPi, which can be saved 
on the private storage. As long as the user cannot access the private RPi’s private 
key it can be said that the data is sealed beyond the user’s reach. This is a very 
useful feature for those scenarios where the user wants to record and process data 
that would otherwise be illegal to so. 
 SOLUTION FOR SOUND SENSING LEGAL ISSUES 3.6.5.1.
For example, recording the user’s surrounding sound 24/7 is an activity from 
which a great deal of context can be extracted (Cordeiro, 2013), however if the 
recording includes other people’s conversations without their knowledge or 
consent it could be illegal under some jurisdictions. A legal definition of sound 
recording is “a recording of sounds, from which the sounds may be reproduced” 
(Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988). Therefore it follows that as long as 
the user cannot reproduce the sounds, legally the activity is not considered to be 
sound recording and therefore is not illegal. 
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A solution to this problem would be for the recording device, such as a 
smartphone, to immediately encrypt the audio recordings with a private key which 
only the private RPi has access to, and sending those files to the private RPi. The 
user will not be able to playback the recordings even if he or she wanted to. At the 
same time, the private RPi will be able to process those files and extract useful 
context, which can be used by the Act and Mind APIs. 
 LIFESERVER SOFTWARE 3.7.
This section details some of the decisions taken with regards to the LifeServer 
software. Similarly to the hardware section, the decisions will take into account 
the GGPs outlined in page 40. 
 DESIGN: API-FIRST VS UI-FIRST 3.7.1.
Traditional user-centric systems normally start their development with 
requirements gathering followed by UI design. By presenting early mock-ups of 
the application interface to the users at the beginning of development cycle, this 
approach ensures early validation of the requirements. 
 
Even though user-centric development is a proven methodology, with the arrival 
of IoT we are witnessing a greater focus towards machine-to-machine (M2M) 
systems that, although often serving users through end-point UIs, increasingly rely 
on well-designed APIs to interact with external systems. Providing well designed 
and open APIs also allows third-party developers to work on integrating their 
products and apps with the platform, which is akin to gaining development work 
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at a low cost. For this reason tech giants such as IBM, Google and Apple are 
quickly adopting what is called API-First Design (Kapoor, 2015). 
Grokya sits neatly as a middleware platform between consumers, developers and 
enterprises, and for that reason the logical choice is to follow the API-First Design 
method. The goal is to provide any developer with the freedom to develop great 
user-facing experiences Powered-by-Grokya, by drawing from the rich contextual 
insights made available by the system’s APIs. 
 CLIENT-LS PAIRING 3.7.2.
When sending personal data via the Sense API, the IoT device or app (herein 
referred to as clients) must ensure that it is sending the right data to the right LS. 
Data that is relevant to the user’s interaction with said client is relevant and should 
be sent to the user’s LS, and not to another user’s LS by mistake. 
This requires that Sense API clients established a logical link to the correct user, 
and this can be achieved explicitly or implicitly. 
 EXPLICIT CLIENT-LS PAIRING 3.7.2.1.
The easiest way to establish a pairing between a client and the LS is to have the 
user explicitly create that pairing, by selecting an option to that effect and 
providing a unique id that allows the client to find the LS on the network. A 
simple example would be to provide a unique username or domain name, which 
the client can use to lookup the LS on the network. Such a scheme would also 
require explicit authentication by the user, so that the client ensures the user does 
in fact have authority to create the pairing. OAuth 2 authentication can be used in 
such a scenario. 
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 IMPLICIT CLIENT-LS PAIRING 3.7.2.2.
The problem with the explicit strategy is that it goes against the GGPs in terms of 
intrusiveness. The Grokya way is to remain as invisible and unobtrusive to the 
user as possible. 
Every sensor that captures data potentially relevant to the user’s context should 
make that data available to the user’s LS, in order to provide a more complete and 
accurate view of the user’s context. Sensors include not only those controlled by 
the user but also those under the control of third parties, such as CCTV cameras, 
ATMs, geo-fencing beacons, RFID card readers, and every digital device that the 
user interacts with, directly or indirectly. An explicit pairing strategy would never 
work in such scenarios. It could be argued that another user’s wearable sensors 
may provide context of relevance if the two users are in close proximity, but care 
should be taken that the data shared is in fact relevant and not in violation of a 
user’s privacy. For example, if Alice and Bob were chatting to each other next to 
the coffee machine at work, it would be advantageous that Alice’s Google Glass 
(or similar device) footage is shared with Bob’s LS, providing a third-person view 
of him. The same cannot be said of Alice’s heart rate, measured by her HRM 
monitor. 
Sensors and LS must coordinate to determine which data is relevant to whom. It is 
equally important that private data is not accidentally shared with a user that is not 
in the vicinity of the sensor at that time, as that could potentially violate the 
privacy of other users. 
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 MINIMUM ANDROID API VERSION 3.7.3.
As part of this project’s PoC, an Android app should be developed in order to test 
some of the APIs from the point-of-view of an IoT device. 
When developing an Android application, a choice must be made with regards to 
the minimum Software Developer Kit (SDK), or Android API version, that the 
application requires. Choosing lower API versions means that more devices will 
support running the app, however it also means that some Android features will 
not be available to the app. 
For the Grokya Android App the choice was API 18, which corresponds to 
Android 4.3 (Jelly Bean), because it is the lowest API that supports Bluetooth 
Low Energy (BLE) connectivity. BLE is essential for connecting to external 
wearable sensors, and beacons, whilst keeping battery consumption to a 
minimum. By choosing API 18, at the time of writing (July 2015) an estimated 
40.9% of the devices that are active on the Google Play Store will be able to run 
this app. This number is expected to increase as more device owners upgrade their 
devices. 
 RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR: PSEUDO VS TRUE 3.7.4.
A secure system requires strong cryptographic keys that in turn require an equally 
strong random number generator. Random number generators are typically 
divided into two types: Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs), and True 
Random Number Generators (TRNGs). 
PRNGs use a mixture of mathematical formulas and pre-defined tables to generate 
large amounts of seemingly random numbers. However the process is 
deterministic and, even if very efficient, the numbers are not truly random. 
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TRNGs, on the other hand, make use of unpredictable external physical 
phenomena in order to generate true random numbers. Since the process depends 
on the limited amount of entropy generated by its physical input, TRNGs are 
considerably slower than TRNGs. 
Even though TRNGs are less efficient, for the purposes of this project, the need is 
for strong cryptographic keys, therefore quality is preferred over quantity. For this 
reason the system should make use of a TRNG, and section 5.2 will include 
details of two TRNGs tested for the project. 
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 IMPLEMENTATION 4.
Due to the relatively big scope of this project, a full implementation of every 
aspect of the platform would be impossible given the limited amount of time 
available. Choices had to be made with regards to the scope of implementation. 
 IMPLEMENTATION SCOPE 4.1.
The main focus of the implementation was on building a secure hardware 
platform on which the LS software and APIs could execute. 
The secondary focus was on the actual APIs and providing a POC of how VDP 
can be applied to a Mind API operation. Although originally considered in scope, 
the API implementation was not completed. 
 
Other aspects such as a peer-to-peer network of LS nodes and Mind API 
operations over large number of nodes were left out of scope. 
 DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE 4.2.
This project has followed a prototyping software development lifecycle, which is 
summarised in Figure 17 below. 
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Figure 17 – Prototyping Development Lifecycle 
 
Since the overall POC relied on multiple independent systems working together, 
the interoperability between these systems could present significant unknown 
obstacles and therefore posed the highest implementation risk. For this reason the 
early focus of the implementation was to concurrently develop the basics of each 
system to a point where their interaction could be proven to work. Only then was 
each system independently developed to fulfil its individual requirements and 
design specifications. 
The implementation started with the hardware, followed by the software. The 
following sections describe details of each. 
 HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION 4.3.
For the purpose of the project’s POC the choice of hardware was relatively 
straightforward. The Raspberry Pi (RPi) computer is both affordable and great for 
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prototyping. It features a General Purpose I/O (GPIO) connector that will also 
come in useful to connect the two systems via the data diode. 
A 1TB external USB hard disk drive (HDD) was chosen to provide the private 
RPi with extra storage, since this is where most of the long-term storage will 
reside. 
A smaller 128GB USB flash drive was chosen to provide the public RPi with 
extra storage. 
The main components for the hardware prototype are as follows: 
• Public RPi: Raspberry Pi 2 Model B 
• Private RPi: Raspberry Pi Model B+ 
• Public RPi storage: SanDisk 128GB Flash Drive 
• Private RPi storage: Western Digital Elements 1TB USB HDD 
• USB Hub: Transcend TS-HUB3K USB 3.0 Hub 
The following diagram details the hardware components and how they link to 
each other. 
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Figure 18 - LifeServer Hardware Layout 
 
A powered USB hub was included to provide power for both the RPis as well as 
for the external HDD, via a USB 3.0 cable. 
The reason why the Private RPi cannot connect directly to the external HDD is 
because the later draws more current than the Private RPi can provide directly via 
it’s own USB port. 
On the other hand, the Public RPi’s external storage can be connected directly, 
because the Flash Drive has much lower power requirements than an external 
HDD. 
The public PI is the only component that connects to the external network. 
Even though both the public and private RPis connect to the same USB hub, they 
public RPi only does so via it’s power-in USB jack. This means that no data 
communication can take place between the 2 RPis via the USB hub. Theoretically, 
if the RPi board could measure variations in it’s input power voltage, some 
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communication could take place, but that is not the case with the current RPi 
hardware. 
 DATA DIODE 4.3.1.
The data diode component deserves especial attention, since it’s a key element of 
the hardware. Its purpose is to ensure that no data can travel from the private RPi 
to the public RPi, even in the case that both RPis are colluding to make such a 
data transfer. The private to public data transfer must be impossible at a physics 
level on the wire. 
 PROTOTYPE 1 4.3.1.1.
Following the prototyping methodology the first implementation simply made use 
of a wire connecting the serial transfer (TX) from the public RPi directly to the 
serial receive (RX) of the private RPi. The only other connection was the ground 
(GND) between the two RPis. By missing out the reverse connection (private TX 
to public RX) it prevented data from travelling in the reverse direction. Early tests 
using the command line to send data through the serial connection showed that it 
worked as intended. 
 
Figure 19 - Prototype 1 of the data diode 
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 PROTOTYPE 2 4.3.1.2.
However theoretically it was still possible for the RPIs to programmatically 
reconfigure and reverse the TX/RX functions of the GPIO pins, defeating the 
purpose of the data diode. The solution was to add a physical IC between the 2 
RPis in such as way as to physically prevent the reversal of the data flow on the 
wire. For this purpose a non-inverting buffer was chosen, the CD4050. Prototype 
2 was wired in the following way. 
 
Figure 20 - Prototype 2 of the data diode 
 
This setup was tested; including swapping around the TX/RX on the RPi units 
(TX on the private RPi and RX on the Public RPi) to ensure the IC buffer was 
doing its job. As expected, no communication was possible from the Private RPi 
to the public RPi. The hardware data diode implementation was finalised. 
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Figure 21 – Detail of final data diode implementation 
 
 FORWARD ERROR CORRECTION (FEC) 4.3.1.3.
It should be noted that unidirectional communications prevent the receiver from 
sending simple acknowledgements of data received back to the sender. If data 
corruption occurs the sender will have no way of knowing that it should resend 
the data. In order to work around this issue, a technique called forward error 
correction (FEC) can be used, where the sender adds redundancy to the data, 
allowing the receiver to reconstruct the original data even if noise is introduced in 
the data during the transfer. This redundancy in encoded data is normally found in 
common household items such as CDs, DVDs and QR codes, which allow the 
readers to deal with varying degrees of damaged media, like scratches in a DVD 
or partially covered QR codes. The technique is also applied in long-range 
communications such as deep-space probes that transmit data back to Earth. 
Reed–Solomon codes, turbo codes, and low-density parity check codes are three 
of the most common FEC methods. 
After extensive tests, even at baud rates of 115200, no errors were detected in data 
transmission between the two RPis. For this reason it was decided that FEC was 
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not necessary for the purpose of the POC. However if at a later stage the speed of 
transmission is to be increased (with Linux kernel changes it can reach mega baud 
rates) then FEC should be implemented. 
 ELECTROMAGNETIC ISOLATION (FARADAY CAGE) 4.3.2.
As mentioned in the literature review, a typical side-channel vector of attack is the 
gathering of computer internal state by analysing minute electromagnetic 
variations emanating from said computer. In the case of the RPi this issue is 
magnified because it ships with an FM transmitter out of the box, making it trivial 
to broadcast data wirelessly to within a few centimetres or, provided it is fitted 
with a wire on GPIO pin 7 acting as an antenna, to within a few meters. Since we 
cannot trust the private RPi’s underlying stack, we need to completely isolate it 
from an EM point of view, and the solution here is to enclose it in a faraday cage. 
When choosing the material for the faraday cage the most important factor is its 
conductivity, with the highest conductivity being the best. Table 2 shows the 
relative conductivity of different types of material. 
 
Material IACS % Conductivity 
Silver 105 
Copper 100 
Gold 70 
Aluminum 61 
Nickel 22 
Zinc 27 
Brass 28 
Iron 17 
Tin 15 
Phosphor Bronze 15 
Lead 7 
Nickel Aluminum Bronze 7 
Steel 3 to 15 
 
Source: (“Electrical Conductivity of Materials - Blue Sea Systems,” n.d.) 
Table 2 - IACS conductivity of common materials 
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Given this information, the choice was made to use copper fabric. 
A template was made using the online tool Template Maker1 with the dimensions 
of the enclosure where the private RPi was going to be inserted. After printing and 
transferring the template to the copper fabric, it was cut and folded along the 
correct places. Finally it was placed around the RPi, ready for the next step in the 
implementation. 
 
Figure 22 - Faraday cage template 
 
 
Figure 23 - Faraday cage installation around RPi 
                                                
1 http://www.templatemaker.nl 
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 THERMAL ISOLATION 4.3.3.
Another side-channel attack mentioned in section 2.3.5.1, page 34, was that of 
data leakage through thermal variations on one machine being sensed by another 
nearby machine. Tests were performed to analyze the feasibility of such an attack 
between 2 RPis located in a small enclosure. The full test results are located and 
discussed in section 5.1. In summary, the feasibility of such an attack on the 
proposed setup is very low and no specific measures need be taken for this 
purpose alone. However, as will be discussed later, the potting of the private RPi 
for different reasons actually helps to protect against these kinds of thermal 
attacks. 
 SEALING THE PRIVATE RPI (POTTING) 4.3.4.
In order to allow for the sound sensing use case described in section 3.6.5.1, the 
solution was to totally seal the private RPi in a way that makes it nearly 
impossible for the user to access it’s components, specifically the micro-SD card 
where the RPi stores the private key against which all the sensed data is 
encrypted. This way, even if the user has access to the private storage HDD used 
by the private RPi, without the private key to decrypt the data he or she cannot 
reproduce the sound files, therefore avoiding the legal definition of sound 
recording. 
The most cost effective method of sealing the private RPi is to perform what is 
called potting. Potting an electronics assembly is the process of totally filling the 
assembly with a material, such as silicone or epoxy. When the material dries it 
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forms a strong enclosure that protects the assembly from water, humidity, and 
dust, but more importantly, from direct access by a person to the assembly itself. 
In order to perform the potting of the private RPi, a special container had to be 
designed in order to allow a generous amount of material to surround the RPi, 
especially the zones to the sides and under the RPi where the micro-SD card is 
located. Small holes had to be included to allow the running of the power cable 
and usb cable for the external HDD. The data diode cable did not require a hole in 
the case because it runs vertically, out of the GPIO. 
The case was designed in SketchUp 3D1 and two prototypes were made. The first 
prototype was not suitable because the holes were not big enough to allow for the 
two USB connectors to reach the RPi, and the four support columns for the RPi 
were too narrow and fragile. The second prototype was revised, in increased holes 
and larger supports. The final 3D model can be seen below. 
 
Figure 24 - 3D Model of RPi Container for Potting 
 
This 3D model was then exported as an STL file and 3D printed with PLA. 
                                                
1 http://www.sketchup.com/ 
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The final enclosure, with the RPi already mounted and the faraday cage fabric 
semi-installed can be seen in the following image. 
 
Figure 25 - RPi in 3D printed container 
 
Before mounting the RPi to the enclosure the micro-SD card, already pre-loaded 
with the basic OS image, was inserted into the RPi and super-glue was applied to 
it, making it virtually impossible to remove the micro-SD card from the RPI 
without risking damaging it, which is the point of the exercise. 
With the power cable, USB cable for external HDD, and the data diode cable all 
attached, the assembly was ready for the potting. 
Care was taken to apply hot-glue to the gap between the holes and the cables, 
however this was done on top of the faraday cage fabric, which proved to be a 
mistake. The hot glue did not seal the holes properly and the assembly was not 
water tight, which is obviously an important requirement when potting. 
For this potting the following epoxy compound was chosen: YH-9002A/B. 
The epoxy comes in two containers, one with the resin and another with the 
hardener, and must be mixed in a 5 to 1 ratio by weight, exactly. Once mixed it 
can be applied to the assembly, first with the use of a large syringe for pushing the 
epoxy under the assembly, and later just by pouring it directly from the mixture 
container. 
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Figure 26 - Potting RPi with epoxy 
 
Once finished the epoxy will take up to a few days to cure and solidify, depending 
on the temperature. Once cured, it is extremely hard to remove. 
The final appearance of the private RPi, after potted and sealed with the faraday 
cage: 
 
Figure 27 - Private RPi potted and with faraday cage 
 
 FINAL HARDWARE ASSEMBLY 4.3.5.
With the private RPi potted and totally sealed with the faraday cage, the final 
assembly took place. A shoebox was chosen as the enclosure for the system. Also 
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a passive PoE cable was used in order to have a single port on the enclosure that 
provides both power and network to the whole system. 
Due to the limited space in the enclosure, the RPi’s external HDD was placed at 
the bottom of the enclosure, with the 2 RPi’s placed on top of it. 
 
Figure 28 - Passive PoE set 
 
 
Figure 29 - Passive PoE port open on enclosure 
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Figure 30 - Initial installation of HDD and USB hub 
 
 
Figure 31 - RPis and data diode installed and running 
 
 
Figure 32 - The LS up and running 
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 SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION 4.4.
With regards to the software the implementation was split into three parts: 
1. Setting up the base operating system and required dependencies 
2. Develop a service for Public RPi to Private RPi intercommunication, 
called Callosum 
3. Develop a basic implementation of the APIs, on the Grokya Server App. 
 
The architecture of the software stack is as follows: 
Figure 33 - LS Software Stack 
 
From bottom to top, the OS is Arch Linux, on top of which Docker runs multiple 
software containers, the actual LS services. 
Docker was chosen as opposed to heavier virtualisation technologies that would 
be unfeasible on a RPI. This approach is called a micro-service architecture, 
which favours multiple small single-purpose apps rather than one big monolithic 
application. The benefits are ease of maintenance and the extra security inherent 
to the compartmentalisation of the services. 
The main software apps are: 
LifeServer
Public RPi
Arch Linux
Docker
Grokya Server App
Spring Boot
Callosum
Spring Boot
Private RPi
Arch Linux
Docker
Grokya Mind App
Spring Boot
Callosum
Spring Boot
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• Grokya Server App: runs on the public RPi and is responsible for the 3 
main public facing APIs. 
• Callosum: runs on both RPis and is responsible for controlling the 
communication between the two RPIs. It should be noted that this service 
deals both with a data-diode scenario as well as with a 2-way 
communication channel and can interchange between both modes during 
runtime. 
• Grokya Mind App: (not to be confused with the Mind API) should on the 
private RPi and be responsible for the sealed processing of the data it 
stores. It should be able to respond to queries from the public RPi in the 2-
way communication scenario. Due to lack of time, at the time of writing, 
this app was not yet developed. 
 OPERATING SYSTEM 4.4.1.
Arch Linux was chosen as the operating system because it is lightweight and 
relatively secure, whilst also featuring a wide choice of packages easily installable 
via its package management tool pacman. 
The main focus in terms of installation was to develop a repeatable procedure that, 
given the same starting point with a base image of Arch Linux, would always 
arrive at a fully configured LS system. Instead of just documenting the procedure, 
shell scripts were created to automate the process. This way the shell scripts also 
act as documentation, and provide transparency to the whole process, which 
would not be the case if a fully pre-configured binary image were made available 
instead. The shell scripts can be found in Appendix 10, page 98. 
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 GROKYA SERVER APP 4.4.2.
The Grokya Server app partially implemented the main APIs as well as a basic 
VDP payment processor that distributes revenue amongst the stakeholders (i.e. 
Sense API data sources) that contributed to that revenue. As with all the other 
apps, it was written in Java 8 and used Spring Boot as the underlying framework 
because it is very lightweight and suited to a micro-service running within a 
docker container. 
 CALLOSUM 4.4.3.
The Callosum app implemented a simple wire protocol for the 
intercommunication between the two RPIs. It introduced the concept of a 
CallosumPacket that can encapsulate several types of messages, from a pre-
defined set of message types. When sending data, the sending RPi serializes the 
CallosumPacket and sends it via the wire to the other RPi, which receives it and 
deserializes it. Depending on the message type, the receiving RPi will route de 
message to the appropriate service. 
 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 4.4.4.
The software was developed using the Eclipse IDE, and is version control with the 
use of Git. When developing features, the app is first tested within Eclipse, as well 
as a docker container in the developer’s machine. When it runs satisfactorily, a git 
push sends the changes to a central repo. 
Since docker images are architecture specific, a docker image created in a Mac 
cannot run on the Raspberry Pi. For this reason a build system was setup with a 
RPi dedicated to build the software for the correct architecture. 
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 TESTING 5.
Several tests were performed during the prototyping process. This chapter details 
the tests and their results. 
 THERMAL ATTACK TESTS 5.1.
In order to test the feasibility of a thermal attack as the one described in section 
2.3.5.1, a controlled environment was setup, using temperature sensors running on 
Arduino Uno boards. The setup was as follows: 
 
Figure 34 - Thermal Test Setup 
 
The Arduinos and the RPis all ran a small web-service that, upon requested by the 
logger, returned the current temperature reading. In the case of the Arduinos, they 
returned the reading from the DHT22 temperature and humidity sensor that they 
were fitted with, whereas the RPis returned the reading from their internal CPU 
temperature sensor. 
During the test, the public RPi was idle, and the private RPi was regularly 
throttling its CPU on and off, by running the command “yes > /dev/null” 
concurrently 4 times, in order to max-out all 4 cores in the RPi 2 (these tests were 
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conducted with 2 RPis 2). The hypothesis is that by manipulating the CPU load on 
one of the RPis, the resulting increase and decrease in heat will be detected by the 
other RPi’s build-in sensor. Several tests were performed, each test using a 
different frequency in the CPU throttling cycles. 
 
 
Figure 35 - CPU throttling generated heat: 1-hour cycles 
 
 
Figure 36 - CPU throttling generated heat: 2-hour cycles 
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Figure 37 - CPU throttling generated heat: 3-hour cycles 
 
The tests show that, despite a significant oscillation in the temperature of the 
private RPi, the public RPi hardly moves, with an average of 1 degree Celsius 
deviation. Taking into account that any processing activity on public RPi or 
outside temperature changes would have a significant impact on the public RPi 
temperature, it is safe to conclude that a thermal attack on this current setup is not 
viable. Furthermore, the final LS setup uses a Raspberry Pi B+ as private RPi, 
meaning that it has only 1 CPU and therefore less thermal impact. 
Finally, the potted RPi runs considerably cooler than a non-potted RPi, probably 
because the potting material acts as a heatsink. 
 RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION TESTS 5.2.
Given the need for a good source of entropy and randomness, two TRNGs were 
tested and compared: 
• the RPi’s built-in hardware random number generator (present in both the 
BCM2835 SoC of the models A, B, B+ and Compute Module and the 
BCM2836 SoC of the Raspberry Pi 2 Model B); 
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• the NeuG TRNG running on an FST-01 USB dongle computer, a fully free 
(as in freedom) platform. 
Both TRNGs were tested using the well-known random number testing suite 
Dieharder (Brown, Eddelbuettel, & Bauer, 2009). The full results of the tests are 
presented and discussed below. 
Setting up Raspberry Pi built-in TRNG 
The built-in hardware device on the RPi does not require any special setup on 
Arch Linux, and it should be noted that it is already configured by default to 
supply entropy to /dev/random. 
 
Setting up NeuG device 
The NeuG hardware device does not require any special drivers for Linux. Simply 
plugging it into one of the USB ports will create a TTY device identifier, in this 
case /dev/ttyACM0, that outputs a stream of random data on demand. 
 
It should be noted that the TTY device does need some configuration, to act as a 
raw device. Failing to do so would result in premature end of streaming due to 
programs interpreting random “end-of-file” (EOF) signals. The correct TTY 
configuration, as per the NeuG documentation, should be set as follows: 
$ stty -F /dev/ttyACM0 -echo raw -parenb 
 
All random number files were truncated to the same size, so that the dieharder test 
suite rewinds them the exact same number of times during the tests. 
dd if=dev-urandom.raw of=dev-urandom-trunc.raw bs=1M count=7168 
 
The commands to run all the tests was: 
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time dieharder -g 201 -a -f dev-urandom.raw > dieharder-test-dev-
urandom.txt 
time dieharder -g 201 -a -f dev-random.raw > dieharder-test-dev-
random.txt 
time dieharder -g 201 -a -f neug-random.raw > dieharder-test-neug-
random.txt 
time dieharder -g 201 -a -f pi-builtin-random.raw > dieharder-
test-pi-builtin-random.txt 
time dieharder -g 201 -a -f pi-builtin-random-big.raw > dieharder-
test-pi-builtin-random-big.txt 
 
The results, which can be found in Appendices 11 through to 14, reveal that no 
generator stands out from the others. The main difference is that NeuG is limited 
to around 40Kbps output, whereas the RPI’s built-in works must faster, at rates 
that exceed 100Kbps. For that reason the decision is to use /dev/random which 
draws entropy from the built-in generator. 
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 CONCLUSIONS 6.
This chapter will firstly report some of the problems found during the project and 
how they were resolved. 
It will then discuss the implications of the work and provide recommendations for 
future work. 
 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 6.1.
 SLOW BUILD TIMES ON RASPBERRY PI 6.1.1.
It should be said that the build process on the RPi is very time consuming. A build 
that takes a mere 12 seconds on a MacBook Pro, takes in excess of 20 minutes on 
a Raspberry Pi 2. Fortunately the subsequent running of the software doesn’t 
experience such a similar latency. At present there is no solution to this problem, 
except for using a more powerful build machine and cross-compiling to the arm 
architecture. 
 POTTING A NON-WATER TIGHT CONTAINER 6.1.2.
In the preparation for the potting of the private RPi, a mistake was made when 
making the container watertight. The two small openings for the power and USB 
cable were filled with hot-glue, however this procedure was done on top of the 
faraday cage fabric that was already in place. This means that the hot glue did not 
make full contact with the inside of the holes, leaving small gaps. When filling the 
container with the epoxy these holes, albeit small, leaked a significant amount of 
epoxy leading to a fairly messy finish on the outside. The faraday cage was 
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actually ruined and was replaced later. The leaked epoxy eventually cured and 
was removed with the aid of a power tool. It should be said that it was fairly hard 
to cut the excess epoxy, which is a good sign in terms of the security afforded by 
the potting. 
 DISCUSSION 6.2.
 CONTEXT-AWARE SECURITY 6.2.1.
Context-aware systems can offer a great alternative to traditional authentication 
systems that typically rely solely on user memorized passwords. Users often chose 
passwords that are trivially easy to guess resulting in poor security. Similarly to 
the Nymi biometrics bracelet mentioned in page 22, a context-aware system that 
keeps track of the user’s context in real time and 24/7 can be queried by external 
systems regarding the probability that the user is indeed likely to be attempting to 
authenticate against the system in question. For example, using an ATM can be 
made safer if the ATM queries the user’s LS to verify that the user is in fact, using 
the ATM (or the likelihood of it). If the user is in a different location or context 
(i.e. sleeping) then the ATM operation should be flagged as highly suspicious. 
 MOVING AWAY FROM ADVERTISING 6.3.
Advertising-based revenue models became popular with centralised web services 
because the Internet lacked a built-in payment system. This project proposed a 
decentralised methods of distributing value, so it follows that the online 
advertising model should now be challenged. If a decentralised micro-payment 
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network makes ads redundant, then the usage of Grokya will also shift away from 
advertising and towards other kinds of marketing activities. 
 THE INTERNET OF MINDS 6.4.
If the goal of an LS is to become the “digital mind” of its user then it should 
follow that a p2p network of LS devices becomes an Internet of Minds that 
interacts with the Internet of Things. This can have a significant impact in many 
aspects of life, not least governance. 
 THE ISSUE OF TRUST 6.5.
As long as an IoT device is under the control of a single entity (i.e. the 
manufacturer), with full control over its software updates, it is perfectly possible 
for that device to be turned into a tool of surveillance at any moment. The only 
way to avoid such a situation of power over the user is to relinquish that position 
of power by ensuring that the IoT device only runs open source code co-signed by 
a decentralised authority, in the shape of a committee of industry experts who can 
review and approve the software updates. Only by making the whole process of 
software updates transparent can the manufacturers give the users the assurance 
that their device is acting on their behalf and not against them. 
 TOWARDS DIRECT DEMOCRACY 6.6.
It would not be far fetched to imagine a world where citizens do not elect 
representatives every few years, but instead have a direct vote in each and every 
decision that affects their lives. Of course voting several times a day would 
require a significant effort and one that most people probably would not be able to 
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commit to. However if an LS reaches a high level of understanding of its user and 
their needs and wants, then hypothetically the LS could vote on behalf of the user 
in some, if not all, the micro-referendums.  
 THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 6.7.
Albeit it being a potentially controversial topic, the fact is that governments and 
law enforcement agencies do not share the same economic incentives as for-profit 
enterprises to track citizens. It could be argued that, given some definition of the 
law in terms of code, if an LS knows everything about its user then it can be in a 
position to judge whether the user is staying on the right or wrong side of the law. 
This can have huge implications, because just as enterprises do not need to track 
consumers in order to benefit from high-level analytics, then neither do the law 
enforcement agencies need to closely track our every movement in order to weed 
out the bad form the good. On the other to have a user-owned device potentially 
reporting its owner to the authorities, regardless of the crime, raises moral issues. 
Who decides on the rules, and who decides on their translation into machine-
readable code? 
 
This thesis will conclude with a quote that, in one sentence, both elegantly and 
bluntly summarises the vision and motivation behind this project: 
 
“If someone is going to spy on you, 
it’s probably best if its you.” – Fred Wilson (2006) 
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 APPENDIX – POTTING COMPOUND SAFETY DATA SHEET 9.
物 质 安 全 资 料 表 
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET 
一、化学品及企业标示 Chemical product and company identification  
 
物品名称：环氧树脂胶水 
Article： 
规格型号：YH-9002A/B 
Spec： 
制造商或供货商名称：广州市铂桥电子材料有限公司 
Manufacture or supplier:  
地址及电话：广州市南沙区东涌镇大同工业区  
 Address:  
TEL: 020-34903825  FAX：020-34903825 
 
二、成分资料 Composition  and  information  on  ingredients 
物品中（英）文名称：EPOXY   TH100A/B 
同义名称：环氧树脂  C2H30-[C18H20O3]C15H14O2-C2H3  
中文名称 化学式 CAS.NO   比例 
1、环氧树脂 C2H3O-[C18H20O3]C15H14O2-C2H3 25068-38-6 52% 
2、环氧稀释剂 R-C2H3O 68609-97-2 14% 
3、固化剂 CH3(CH2)-CH=CH-CH2-CH(CH2) 693-98-1 25% 
4、添加剂 H2NC3H6Si(OC2H5)3 108-88-3 8% 
5、色料 C 1333-86-4 1% 
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 APPENDIX – LS OS PREPARATION SHELL SCRIPTS 10.
 
01-grokya-ls-sd-preparation.sh 
 
#!/bin/bash 
 
# set abort on error 
set -e 
 
hdd="$1" 
 
cd ${0%/*}/.. 
 
echo "Partitioning SD card..." 
 
echo "o 
n 
p 
1 
 
+100M 
t 
c 
n 
p 
2 
 
 
w 
"|fdisk $hdd 
 
echo "Formatting boot partition..." 
 
yes | mkfs.vfat ${hdd}1 
mkdir -p work/mount/boot 
mount ${hdd}1 work/mount/boot 
 
retval=$? 
if [ $retval -ne 0 ]; then 
    echo "Return code was not zero but $retval" 
fi 
 
echo "Formatting root partition..." 
 
yes | mkfs.ext4 ${hdd}2 
mkdir -p work/mount/root 
mount ${hdd}2 work/mount/root 
 
echo "Installing Arch Linux..." 
 
mkdir -p work/downloads 
 
echo "Downloading Arch Linux if necessary..." 
wget -nc -P work/downloads/ http://archlinuxarm.org/os/ArchLinuxARM-rpi-2-
latest.tar.gz 
 
echo "Extracting Arch Linux..." 
bsdtar -xpf work/downloads/ArchLinuxARM-rpi-2-latest.tar.gz -C work/mount/root 
sync 
echo "Moving /boot files in place..." 
mv work/mount/root/boot/* work/mount/boot 
 
echo "Installing startup scripts..." 
rsync -av ../ls-setup-scripts work/mount/root/root/ --exclude work/mount 
 
echo "Starting chroot phase..." 
./scripts/02-grokya-ls-chroot.sh 
 
echo "Umounting working directories..." 
umount work/mount/boot work/mount/root 
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echo "Done!" 
 
 
02-grokya-ls-chroot.sh 
 
arch-chroot work/mount/root/ su - root -c /root/ls-setup-scripts/scripts/03-
grokya-ls-arch-setup.sh 
 
 
03-grokya-ls-arch.sh 
 
 
#!/bin/bash 
 
# set hostname 
echo lifeserver > /etc/hostname 
sed -i 's/localhost/lifeserver/g' /etc/hosts 
 
# add user 
useradd -m grokya 
echo "grokya:grokya" | chpasswd 
 
# update system 
pacman --noconfirm -Syu 
 
# install java and rxtx  
pacman --noconfirm -S jre8-openjdk java-rxtx 
 
# setup serial port 
usermod -aG lock,uucp grokya 
# TODO: the next 2 lines may have to be run on first boot (chroot doesn't seem to 
set them properly) 
stty -F /dev/ttyAMA0 -echo raw -parenb 115200 
ln -s /dev/ttyAMA0 /dev/ttyS80 
 
# install docker 
pacman --noconfirm -S docker 
usermod -aG docker grokya 
systemctl enable docker 
 
# fix docker for RPi (https://github.com/docker/docker/issues/16256) 
sed -e "s/ExecStart=\/usr\/bin\/docker -d -H fd:\/\//ExecStart=\/usr\/bin\/docker 
-d -H fd:\/\/ --exec-opt native.cgroupdriver=cgroupfs/" 
/usr/lib/systemd/system/docker.service > /tmp/docker.service 
mv /tmp/docker.service /usr/lib/systemd/system/docker.service 
 
# fix IPv6->IPv4 binding issue 
(https://github.com/docker/docker/issues/2174#issuecomment-149803815) 
echo "IPMasquerade=yes" >> /etc/systemd/network/eth0.network 
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 APPENDIX – DIEHARDER TEST: /DEV/URANDOM 11.
 
$ dieharder-test-dev-urandom.txt  
#=============================================================================# 
#            dieharder version 3.31.1 Copyright 2003 Robert G. Brown          # 
#=============================================================================# 
   rng_name    |           filename             |rands/second| 
 file_input_raw|                 dev-urandom.raw|  1.02e+07  | 
#=============================================================================# 
        test_name   |ntup| tsamples |psamples|  p-value |Assessment 
#=============================================================================# 
   diehard_birthdays|   0|       100|     100|0.01601781|  PASSED   
      diehard_operm5|   0|   1000000|     100|0.81220319|  PASSED   
  diehard_rank_32x32|   0|     40000|     100|0.27361261|  PASSED   
    diehard_rank_6x8|   0|    100000|     100|0.05141190|  PASSED   
   diehard_bitstream|   0|   2097152|     100|0.27894532|  PASSED   
        diehard_opso|   0|   2097152|     100|0.60673609|  PASSED   
        diehard_oqso|   0|   2097152|     100|0.25737640|  PASSED   
         diehard_dna|   0|   2097152|     100|0.20130100|  PASSED   
diehard_count_1s_str|   0|    256000|     100|0.92825850|  PASSED   
diehard_count_1s_byt|   0|    256000|     100|0.28826158|  PASSED   
 diehard_parking_lot|   0|     12000|     100|0.86481685|  PASSED   
    diehard_2dsphere|   2|      8000|     100|0.56912624|  PASSED   
    diehard_3dsphere|   3|      4000|     100|0.30329621|  PASSED   
     diehard_squeeze|   0|    100000|     100|0.99380636|  PASSED   
        diehard_sums|   0|       100|     100|0.49104912|  PASSED   
        diehard_runs|   0|    100000|     100|0.11960026|  PASSED   
        diehard_runs|   0|    100000|     100|0.24135654|  PASSED   
       diehard_craps|   0|    200000|     100|0.87326261|  PASSED   
       diehard_craps|   0|    200000|     100|0.91856009|  PASSED   
 marsaglia_tsang_gcd|   0|  10000000|     100|0.29619428|  PASSED   
 marsaglia_tsang_gcd|   0|  10000000|     100|0.75426874|  PASSED   
         sts_monobit|   1|    100000|     100|0.49959275|  PASSED   
            sts_runs|   2|    100000|     100|0.78844724|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   1|    100000|     100|0.72435469|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   2|    100000|     100|0.92098160|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   3|    100000|     100|0.70195499|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   3|    100000|     100|0.57071891|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   4|    100000|     100|0.47091269|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   4|    100000|     100|0.24626278|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   5|    100000|     100|0.99669531|   WEAK    
          sts_serial|   5|    100000|     100|0.93881982|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   6|    100000|     100|0.79976628|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   6|    100000|     100|0.54952100|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   7|    100000|     100|0.72445145|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   7|    100000|     100|0.99746027|   WEAK    
          sts_serial|   8|    100000|     100|0.69463917|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   8|    100000|     100|0.34859315|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   9|    100000|     100|0.65658857|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   9|    100000|     100|0.82680540|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  10|    100000|     100|0.68282318|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  10|    100000|     100|0.61058368|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  11|    100000|     100|0.71861718|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  11|    100000|     100|0.89515493|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  12|    100000|     100|0.74148706|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  12|    100000|     100|0.26932113|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  13|    100000|     100|0.99949313|   WEAK    
          sts_serial|  13|    100000|     100|0.93933919|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  14|    100000|     100|0.59969741|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  14|    100000|     100|0.29776462|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  15|    100000|     100|0.47338425|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  15|    100000|     100|0.16159427|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  16|    100000|     100|0.97274234|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  16|    100000|     100|0.51845614|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   1|    100000|     100|0.97282348|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   2|    100000|     100|0.08043995|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   3|    100000|     100|0.28874219|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   4|    100000|     100|0.13818700|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   5|    100000|     100|0.40809359|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   6|    100000|     100|0.90206433|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   7|    100000|     100|0.34021584|  PASSED   
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         rgb_bitdist|   8|    100000|     100|0.81531523|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   9|    100000|     100|0.23865448|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|  10|    100000|     100|0.84465684|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|  11|    100000|     100|0.47399477|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|  12|    100000|     100|0.16549648|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   2|     10000|    1000|0.12250151|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   3|     10000|    1000|0.88632161|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   4|     10000|    1000|0.84267001|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   5|     10000|    1000|0.05989242|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   2|    100000|     100|0.49459444|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   3|    100000|     100|0.36762449|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   4|    100000|     100|0.52682302|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   5|    100000|     100|0.32825974|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   0|   1000000|     100|0.45680694|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   1|   1000000|     100|0.54564159|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   2|   1000000|     100|0.70765046|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   3|   1000000|     100|0.79892901|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   4|   1000000|     100|0.62202415|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   5|   1000000|     100|0.82119915|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   6|   1000000|     100|0.89224820|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   7|   1000000|     100|0.54912437|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   8|   1000000|     100|0.20879414|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   9|   1000000|     100|0.06459332|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  10|   1000000|     100|0.54787327|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  11|   1000000|     100|0.87919812|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  12|   1000000|     100|0.75681773|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  13|   1000000|     100|0.11763166|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  14|   1000000|     100|0.73742242|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  15|   1000000|     100|0.30914542|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  16|   1000000|     100|0.58505819|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  17|   1000000|     100|0.81390089|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  18|   1000000|     100|0.77810421|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  19|   1000000|     100|0.20879803|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  20|   1000000|     100|0.47675291|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  21|   1000000|     100|0.58019509|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  22|   1000000|     100|0.51400827|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  23|   1000000|     100|0.11021201|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  24|   1000000|     100|0.40830609|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  25|   1000000|     100|0.06650902|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  26|   1000000|     100|0.00543357|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  27|   1000000|     100|0.50118182|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  28|   1000000|     100|0.86761086|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  29|   1000000|     100|0.62221948|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  30|   1000000|     100|0.43794640|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  31|   1000000|     100|0.87900118|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  32|   1000000|     100|0.26657919|  PASSED   
     rgb_kstest_test|   0|     10000|    1000|0.65301741|  PASSED   
     dab_bytedistrib|   0|  51200000|       1|0.60349920|  PASSED   
             dab_dct| 256|     50000|       1|0.65273698|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 207.  ntuple = 0 
        dab_filltree|  32|  15000000|       1|0.93852215|  PASSED   
        dab_filltree|  32|  15000000|       1|0.84733656|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 208.  ntuple = 0 
       dab_filltree2|   0|   5000000|       1|0.18347079|  PASSED   
       dab_filltree2|   1|   5000000|       1|0.18845977|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 209.  ntuple = 0 
        dab_monobit2|  12|  65000000|       1|0.87729688|  PASSED 
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#=============================================================================# 
#            dieharder version 3.31.1 Copyright 2003 Robert G. Brown          # 
#=============================================================================# 
   rng_name    |           filename             |rands/second| 
 file_input_raw|                  dev-random.raw|  1.55e+07  | 
#=============================================================================# 
        test_name   |ntup| tsamples |psamples|  p-value |Assessment 
#=============================================================================# 
   diehard_birthdays|   0|       100|     100|0.56076347|  PASSED   
      diehard_operm5|   0|   1000000|     100|0.54533269|  PASSED   
  diehard_rank_32x32|   0|     40000|     100|0.32000993|  PASSED   
    diehard_rank_6x8|   0|    100000|     100|0.76275024|  PASSED   
   diehard_bitstream|   0|   2097152|     100|0.63053368|  PASSED   
        diehard_opso|   0|   2097152|     100|0.12079836|  PASSED   
        diehard_oqso|   0|   2097152|     100|0.45499297|  PASSED   
         diehard_dna|   0|   2097152|     100|0.87265280|  PASSED   
diehard_count_1s_str|   0|    256000|     100|0.28132278|  PASSED   
diehard_count_1s_byt|   0|    256000|     100|0.38232403|  PASSED   
 diehard_parking_lot|   0|     12000|     100|0.01002226|  PASSED   
    diehard_2dsphere|   2|      8000|     100|0.92254447|  PASSED   
    diehard_3dsphere|   3|      4000|     100|0.07066726|  PASSED   
     diehard_squeeze|   0|    100000|     100|0.57747960|  PASSED   
        diehard_sums|   0|       100|     100|0.93029416|  PASSED   
        diehard_runs|   0|    100000|     100|0.18406317|  PASSED   
        diehard_runs|   0|    100000|     100|0.54953016|  PASSED   
       diehard_craps|   0|    200000|     100|0.86703027|  PASSED   
       diehard_craps|   0|    200000|     100|0.30639650|  PASSED   
 marsaglia_tsang_gcd|   0|  10000000|     100|0.14538809|  PASSED   
 marsaglia_tsang_gcd|   0|  10000000|     100|0.95971817|  PASSED   
         sts_monobit|   1|    100000|     100|0.81392856|  PASSED   
            sts_runs|   2|    100000|     100|0.99937546|   WEAK    
          sts_serial|   1|    100000|     100|0.82060740|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   2|    100000|     100|0.67456120|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   3|    100000|     100|0.92967246|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   3|    100000|     100|0.94029458|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   4|    100000|     100|0.98618610|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   4|    100000|     100|0.99404514|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   5|    100000|     100|0.50281719|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   5|    100000|     100|0.43512984|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   6|    100000|     100|0.66359687|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   6|    100000|     100|0.33434014|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   7|    100000|     100|0.36787347|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   7|    100000|     100|0.82204473|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   8|    100000|     100|0.88923566|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   8|    100000|     100|0.45407924|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   9|    100000|     100|0.21567827|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   9|    100000|     100|0.37497504|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  10|    100000|     100|0.76400076|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  10|    100000|     100|0.53647825|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  11|    100000|     100|0.97956255|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  11|    100000|     100|0.37232324|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  12|    100000|     100|0.27398505|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  12|    100000|     100|0.38751517|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  13|    100000|     100|0.26127727|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  13|    100000|     100|0.30868235|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  14|    100000|     100|0.60608777|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  14|    100000|     100|0.83148107|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  15|    100000|     100|0.67152129|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  15|    100000|     100|0.71528346|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  16|    100000|     100|0.81202823|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  16|    100000|     100|0.52628960|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   1|    100000|     100|0.60189355|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   2|    100000|     100|0.99769636|   WEAK    
         rgb_bitdist|   3|    100000|     100|0.93347342|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   4|    100000|     100|0.89292777|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   5|    100000|     100|0.05387356|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   6|    100000|     100|0.20423878|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   7|    100000|     100|0.97060945|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   8|    100000|     100|0.42237803|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   9|    100000|     100|0.06869971|  PASSED   
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         rgb_bitdist|  10|    100000|     100|0.90974564|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|  11|    100000|     100|0.50820739|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|  12|    100000|     100|0.82809420|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   2|     10000|    1000|0.28472200|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   3|     10000|    1000|0.76366305|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   4|     10000|    1000|0.96187766|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   5|     10000|    1000|0.08315055|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   2|    100000|     100|0.85229696|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   3|    100000|     100|0.77998375|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   4|    100000|     100|0.86253038|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   5|    100000|     100|0.39147614|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   0|   1000000|     100|0.67004506|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   1|   1000000|     100|0.86909895|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   2|   1000000|     100|0.50354994|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   3|   1000000|     100|0.18308552|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   4|   1000000|     100|0.74084618|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   5|   1000000|     100|0.69356258|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   6|   1000000|     100|0.04038407|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   7|   1000000|     100|0.14955176|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   8|   1000000|     100|0.33254496|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   9|   1000000|     100|0.11220245|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  10|   1000000|     100|0.02550530|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  11|   1000000|     100|0.94292634|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  12|   1000000|     100|0.75302333|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  13|   1000000|     100|0.18376902|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  14|   1000000|     100|0.67671462|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  15|   1000000|     100|0.78142945|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  16|   1000000|     100|0.29636210|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  17|   1000000|     100|0.55623898|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  18|   1000000|     100|0.97525959|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  19|   1000000|     100|0.41378251|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  20|   1000000|     100|0.14589978|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  21|   1000000|     100|0.62827593|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  22|   1000000|     100|0.71224169|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  23|   1000000|     100|0.63029963|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  24|   1000000|     100|0.75292718|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  25|   1000000|     100|0.79309876|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  26|   1000000|     100|0.22623464|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  27|   1000000|     100|0.25957095|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  28|   1000000|     100|0.18866673|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  29|   1000000|     100|0.02690510|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  30|   1000000|     100|0.56285030|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  31|   1000000|     100|0.44184137|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  32|   1000000|     100|0.99892846|   WEAK    
     rgb_kstest_test|   0|     10000|    1000|0.97243855|  PASSED   
     dab_bytedistrib|   0|  51200000|       1|0.10844598|  PASSED   
             dab_dct| 256|     50000|       1|0.37095973|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 207.  ntuple = 0 
        dab_filltree|  32|  15000000|       1|0.28905522|  PASSED   
        dab_filltree|  32|  15000000|       1|0.36484758|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 208.  ntuple = 0 
       dab_filltree2|   0|   5000000|       1|0.51053208|  PASSED   
       dab_filltree2|   1|   5000000|       1|0.97084031|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 209.  ntuple = 0 
        dab_monobit2|  12|  65000000|       1|0.94701176|  PASSED 
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 APPENDIX – DIEHARDER TEST: PI BUILT-IN 13.
$ more dieharder-test-pi-builtin-random.txt  
#=============================================================================# 
#            dieharder version 3.31.1 Copyright 2003 Robert G. Brown          # 
#=============================================================================# 
   rng_name    |           filename             |rands/second| 
 file_input_raw|           pi-builtin-random.raw|  1.05e+07  | 
#=============================================================================# 
        test_name   |ntup| tsamples |psamples|  p-value |Assessment 
#=============================================================================# 
   diehard_birthdays|   0|       100|     100|0.28688816|  PASSED   
      diehard_operm5|   0|   1000000|     100|0.71215185|  PASSED   
  diehard_rank_32x32|   0|     40000|     100|0.26006665|  PASSED   
    diehard_rank_6x8|   0|    100000|     100|0.41525526|  PASSED   
   diehard_bitstream|   0|   2097152|     100|0.40545306|  PASSED   
        diehard_opso|   0|   2097152|     100|0.89107541|  PASSED   
        diehard_oqso|   0|   2097152|     100|0.73216666|  PASSED   
         diehard_dna|   0|   2097152|     100|0.48658022|  PASSED   
diehard_count_1s_str|   0|    256000|     100|0.13335067|  PASSED   
diehard_count_1s_byt|   0|    256000|     100|0.74042755|  PASSED   
 diehard_parking_lot|   0|     12000|     100|0.59033501|  PASSED   
    diehard_2dsphere|   2|      8000|     100|0.97594943|  PASSED   
    diehard_3dsphere|   3|      4000|     100|0.62708217|  PASSED   
     diehard_squeeze|   0|    100000|     100|0.38140481|  PASSED   
        diehard_sums|   0|       100|     100|0.03294898|  PASSED   
        diehard_runs|   0|    100000|     100|0.01743073|  PASSED   
        diehard_runs|   0|    100000|     100|0.74448223|  PASSED   
       diehard_craps|   0|    200000|     100|0.87703388|  PASSED   
       diehard_craps|   0|    200000|     100|0.84304348|  PASSED   
 marsaglia_tsang_gcd|   0|  10000000|     100|0.19678462|  PASSED   
 marsaglia_tsang_gcd|   0|  10000000|     100|0.60607225|  PASSED   
         sts_monobit|   1|    100000|     100|0.99933794|   WEAK    
            sts_runs|   2|    100000|     100|0.03930543|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   1|    100000|     100|0.80693911|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   2|    100000|     100|0.39789799|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   3|    100000|     100|0.90101190|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   3|    100000|     100|0.68484986|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   4|    100000|     100|0.23118460|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   4|    100000|     100|0.66038884|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   5|    100000|     100|0.52591780|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   5|    100000|     100|0.77791272|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   6|    100000|     100|0.63472361|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   6|    100000|     100|0.87919339|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   7|    100000|     100|0.76668178|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   7|    100000|     100|0.45321114|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   8|    100000|     100|0.22874552|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   8|    100000|     100|0.24832635|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   9|    100000|     100|0.01406337|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   9|    100000|     100|0.01477669|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  10|    100000|     100|0.07691219|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  10|    100000|     100|0.68904429|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  11|    100000|     100|0.97067835|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  11|    100000|     100|0.19196503|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  12|    100000|     100|0.89192782|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  12|    100000|     100|0.45426198|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  13|    100000|     100|0.61261279|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  13|    100000|     100|0.92786301|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  14|    100000|     100|0.81208829|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  14|    100000|     100|0.75406286|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  15|    100000|     100|0.79132046|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  15|    100000|     100|0.70659001|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  16|    100000|     100|0.92964638|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  16|    100000|     100|0.93632297|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   1|    100000|     100|0.96987845|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   2|    100000|     100|0.97177581|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   3|    100000|     100|0.97010290|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   4|    100000|     100|0.27709112|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   5|    100000|     100|0.64107279|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   6|    100000|     100|0.35094460|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   7|    100000|     100|0.31953730|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   8|    100000|     100|0.37452958|  PASSED   
 105 
         rgb_bitdist|   9|    100000|     100|0.18606734|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|  10|    100000|     100|0.44688654|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|  11|    100000|     100|0.98930489|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|  12|    100000|     100|0.71400461|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   2|     10000|    1000|0.55038886|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   3|     10000|    1000|0.58175990|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   4|     10000|    1000|0.19573296|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   5|     10000|    1000|0.82291677|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   2|    100000|     100|0.97564438|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   3|    100000|     100|0.95561474|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   4|    100000|     100|0.46812640|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   5|    100000|     100|0.12999627|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   0|   1000000|     100|0.60526096|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   1|   1000000|     100|0.74907041|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   2|   1000000|     100|0.14046130|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   3|   1000000|     100|0.84367599|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   4|   1000000|     100|0.55208422|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   5|   1000000|     100|0.92752218|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   6|   1000000|     100|0.53848595|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   7|   1000000|     100|0.52446225|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   8|   1000000|     100|0.07821347|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   9|   1000000|     100|0.72865610|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  10|   1000000|     100|0.79467779|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  11|   1000000|     100|0.96264475|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  12|   1000000|     100|0.87741678|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  13|   1000000|     100|0.69901222|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  14|   1000000|     100|0.39866587|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  15|   1000000|     100|0.97582528|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  16|   1000000|     100|0.64930785|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  17|   1000000|     100|0.36487658|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  18|   1000000|     100|0.32561193|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  19|   1000000|     100|0.56034261|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  20|   1000000|     100|0.54579125|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  21|   1000000|     100|0.13104318|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  22|   1000000|     100|0.97371703|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  23|   1000000|     100|0.22569577|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  24|   1000000|     100|0.99885183|   WEAK    
      rgb_lagged_sum|  25|   1000000|     100|0.49187439|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  26|   1000000|     100|0.91917567|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  27|   1000000|     100|0.15712840|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  28|   1000000|     100|0.10931251|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  29|   1000000|     100|0.59007041|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  30|   1000000|     100|0.56567619|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  31|   1000000|     100|0.45601290|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  32|   1000000|     100|0.54987187|  PASSED   
     rgb_kstest_test|   0|     10000|    1000|0.20895553|  PASSED   
     dab_bytedistrib|   0|  51200000|       1|0.40280744|  PASSED   
             dab_dct| 256|     50000|       1|0.88542539|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 207.  ntuple = 0 
        dab_filltree|  32|  15000000|       1|0.65730333|  PASSED   
        dab_filltree|  32|  15000000|       1|0.59811659|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 208.  ntuple = 0 
       dab_filltree2|   0|   5000000|       1|0.57733908|  PASSED   
       dab_filltree2|   1|   5000000|       1|0.46380463|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 209.  ntuple = 0 
        dab_monobit2|  12|  65000000|       1|0.65444480|  PASSED 
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 APPENDIX – DIEHARDER TEST: NEUG 14.
$ more dieharder-test-neug-random.txt  
#=============================================================================# 
#            dieharder version 3.31.1 Copyright 2003 Robert G. Brown          # 
#=============================================================================# 
   rng_name    |           filename             |rands/second| 
 file_input_raw|                 neug-random.raw|  1.61e+07  | 
#=============================================================================# 
        test_name   |ntup| tsamples |psamples|  p-value |Assessment 
#=============================================================================# 
   diehard_birthdays|   0|       100|     100|0.02720373|  PASSED   
      diehard_operm5|   0|   1000000|     100|0.50594413|  PASSED   
  diehard_rank_32x32|   0|     40000|     100|0.80044834|  PASSED   
    diehard_rank_6x8|   0|    100000|     100|0.56116610|  PASSED   
   diehard_bitstream|   0|   2097152|     100|0.83370023|  PASSED   
        diehard_opso|   0|   2097152|     100|0.95564329|  PASSED   
        diehard_oqso|   0|   2097152|     100|0.46410706|  PASSED   
         diehard_dna|   0|   2097152|     100|0.73965110|  PASSED   
diehard_count_1s_str|   0|    256000|     100|0.18643691|  PASSED   
diehard_count_1s_byt|   0|    256000|     100|0.26398686|  PASSED   
 diehard_parking_lot|   0|     12000|     100|0.54444845|  PASSED   
    diehard_2dsphere|   2|      8000|     100|0.78962307|  PASSED   
    diehard_3dsphere|   3|      4000|     100|0.90519655|  PASSED   
     diehard_squeeze|   0|    100000|     100|0.86902967|  PASSED   
        diehard_sums|   0|       100|     100|0.32788953|  PASSED   
        diehard_runs|   0|    100000|     100|0.01293063|  PASSED   
        diehard_runs|   0|    100000|     100|0.97162844|  PASSED   
       diehard_craps|   0|    200000|     100|0.91431394|  PASSED   
       diehard_craps|   0|    200000|     100|0.77463832|  PASSED   
 marsaglia_tsang_gcd|   0|  10000000|     100|0.71741763|  PASSED   
 marsaglia_tsang_gcd|   0|  10000000|     100|0.19844569|  PASSED   
         sts_monobit|   1|    100000|     100|0.89076205|  PASSED   
            sts_runs|   2|    100000|     100|0.03970224|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   1|    100000|     100|0.85303566|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   2|    100000|     100|0.98827844|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   3|    100000|     100|0.63604337|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   3|    100000|     100|0.27333066|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   4|    100000|     100|0.14008852|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   4|    100000|     100|0.21049589|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   5|    100000|     100|0.17750107|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   5|    100000|     100|0.35868297|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   6|    100000|     100|0.31621427|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   6|    100000|     100|0.73220832|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   7|    100000|     100|0.47255193|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   7|    100000|     100|0.47464138|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   8|    100000|     100|0.14069505|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   8|    100000|     100|0.66506616|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   9|    100000|     100|0.91487528|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|   9|    100000|     100|0.88166035|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  10|    100000|     100|0.09767396|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  10|    100000|     100|0.15594996|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  11|    100000|     100|0.32901497|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  11|    100000|     100|0.82795317|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  12|    100000|     100|0.39266048|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  12|    100000|     100|0.72305874|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  13|    100000|     100|0.46249765|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  13|    100000|     100|0.96949949|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  14|    100000|     100|0.99004878|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  14|    100000|     100|0.08325366|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  15|    100000|     100|0.68517592|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  15|    100000|     100|0.81872374|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  16|    100000|     100|0.93019224|  PASSED   
          sts_serial|  16|    100000|     100|0.88184439|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   1|    100000|     100|0.86207305|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   2|    100000|     100|0.19177094|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   3|    100000|     100|0.95847307|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   4|    100000|     100|0.53843358|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   5|    100000|     100|0.76616687|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   6|    100000|     100|0.83609469|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   7|    100000|     100|0.73276465|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|   8|    100000|     100|0.06172539|  PASSED   
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         rgb_bitdist|   9|    100000|     100|0.46369493|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|  10|    100000|     100|0.83278715|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|  11|    100000|     100|0.58550503|  PASSED   
         rgb_bitdist|  12|    100000|     100|0.42537279|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   2|     10000|    1000|0.63673038|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   3|     10000|    1000|0.79580054|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   4|     10000|    1000|0.99482281|  PASSED   
rgb_minimum_distance|   5|     10000|    1000|0.73252922|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   2|    100000|     100|0.93102570|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   3|    100000|     100|0.99196479|  PASSED   
    rgb_permutations|   4|    100000|     100|0.99794238|   WEAK    
    rgb_permutations|   5|    100000|     100|0.70583102|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   0|   1000000|     100|0.89911516|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   1|   1000000|     100|0.81100514|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   2|   1000000|     100|0.71454619|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   3|   1000000|     100|0.76150327|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   4|   1000000|     100|0.78755611|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   5|   1000000|     100|0.12453920|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   6|   1000000|     100|0.72041832|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   7|   1000000|     100|0.75752579|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   8|   1000000|     100|0.31352444|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|   9|   1000000|     100|0.73537387|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  10|   1000000|     100|0.87852817|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  11|   1000000|     100|0.93726342|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  12|   1000000|     100|0.85749941|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  13|   1000000|     100|0.80435141|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  14|   1000000|     100|0.54617316|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  15|   1000000|     100|0.27230666|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  16|   1000000|     100|0.59010132|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  17|   1000000|     100|0.44808597|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  18|   1000000|     100|0.26119680|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  19|   1000000|     100|0.38892342|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  20|   1000000|     100|0.66053096|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  21|   1000000|     100|0.86246821|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  22|   1000000|     100|0.98146311|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  23|   1000000|     100|0.21185090|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  24|   1000000|     100|0.34542950|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  25|   1000000|     100|0.81893495|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  26|   1000000|     100|0.88053540|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  27|   1000000|     100|0.03652345|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  28|   1000000|     100|0.10270837|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  29|   1000000|     100|0.93413152|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  30|   1000000|     100|0.10521408|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  31|   1000000|     100|0.74603708|  PASSED   
      rgb_lagged_sum|  32|   1000000|     100|0.99856776|   WEAK    
     rgb_kstest_test|   0|     10000|    1000|0.96149249|  PASSED   
     dab_bytedistrib|   0|  51200000|       1|0.45216823|  PASSED   
             dab_dct| 256|     50000|       1|0.49959599|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 207.  ntuple = 0 
        dab_filltree|  32|  15000000|       1|0.03935264|  PASSED   
        dab_filltree|  32|  15000000|       1|0.94047345|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 208.  ntuple = 0 
       dab_filltree2|   0|   5000000|       1|0.69101210|  PASSED   
       dab_filltree2|   1|   5000000|       1|0.33741247|  PASSED   
Preparing to run test 209.  ntuple = 0 
        dab_monobit2|  12|  65000000|       1|0.41345852|  PASSED 
 
